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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent discussions about implementing a competitive regulatory
securities regime in the United States have raised questions about the
efficiency of the present regulatory structure.1 Specifically, proponents of
regulatory competition believe that competition will bring about a more
efficient set of regulations. Broadly speaking, the theory is that businesses
will raise capital under regulatory regimes that present the lowest cost of
capital, and investors will flock to regimes that provide them with the
greatest returns on their investments. In this way, the most efficient regimes
would be identified. Of course, under the present set of regimes, there is
already some regulatory competition between countries as capital moves
from one country to another.2 The proposals for regulatory competition
hope to make these international capital flows more efficient.3 The present
regulations governing such investment movement out of the United States
is the subject of this article. In particular, the article focuses on U.S.
securities laws that may inhibit the movement of U.S. non-institutional
(retail) investors to foreign markets.4
This article examines the restrictions that Regulation S of the 1933
Securities Act (the "Securities Act") places on U.S. investors wishing to
purchase foreign securities. Regulation S is the primary set of rules
promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission (the "Commission")
to regulate U.S. investment in foreign securities. In particular, this article
focuses on what are termed "Category 1 securities," which are explained in
detail in Part II. The article also considers restrictions on purchases of
foreign securities imposed by other facets of the Securities Act and of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act (the "Exchange Act"). The article isolates
Section 4(3) of the Securities Act and Rule 15a-6 of the Exchange Act for
I See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A MarketApproach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE
L.J. 2359 (1998); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Howell Jackson & Eric Pan, Regulatory
Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence fom Europe in 1999 - Part 1, 56 Bus. LAw. 653
(2001).
2 See Choi & Guzman, supra note 1, at 906; Joseph F. Jacob, The Impact of the Euro on the United
States Equity Markets, 13 ST.JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT 399 (1998).
3 See Choi & Guzman, supra note 1, at 906; Romano, supra note 1, at 2418.
4 This article does not discuss laws that inhibit the movement of U.S. issuers to such other
markets and leaves that problem to future research. As a starting point though, one would think about
any barriers to U.S. issuers that result from the restrictions imposed by Category 3 status. For example,
one would have to consider any markets on which U.S. securities could not be traded because of U.S.
Category 3 restrictions. Category 3 of Regulation S is explained in Part II of this article.
INVESTING ABROAD
analysis and discussion. Furthermore, the article studies whether or not the
restrictions found are followed in the market and the effects of these
restrictions on the market.
The article concludes that the main impediments to U.S. retail
investment abroad are the restrictions U.S. securities laws place on
advertisement and solicitation. This result is accurately reflected in the
market by the fact that U.S. brokers are able to purchase foreign securities
abroad for U.S. retail investors with little difficulty. This is in accordance
with the theoretical underpinnings of Regulation S. Under the theory of
Regulation S, U.S. retail investors, isolated from solicitation by foreign
issuers and brokers, are unaware of foreign opportunities; therefore, they
will not invest in foreign securities. While the analysis in this article reveals
a number of statutory difficulties and the market evidence unearths a couple
of surprising results, Regulation S, in general, appears, at the present time,
to be effective.
Since the literature on regulatory competition frames the subject of this
article, a brief review of literature is in order. In 1998, Professor Roberta
Romano set forth a proposal that would permit each state to promulgate its
own regulatory regime, and would allow companies the choice of the regime
by which it would be governed s Professor Romano believes that, under
such a system, companies and investors would flock to the most efficient
regulatory regimes.6 Professor Romano also advances an extension of this
theory into the arena of foreign securities by opening up U.S. markets to
foreign issuers who abide by a foreign regulatory regime.7 In theory, this
competition between regulatory regimes would force the U.S. system to
become more efficient.8 Professors Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman
propose a similar solution, which they call "portable reciprocity." 9 Portable
reciprocity would allow issuers to pick the international regulatory regime
of their choice and trade their securities on any market in the world."0 Such
proposals would truly allow the flow of capital globally, even beyond the
capital flow already seen today.
Professor Howell Jackson and his co-author, Eric Pan, however, have
found evidence in the European market that appears counter to the expected
5 Romano, supra note 1, at 2362.
6 Id. at 2428.
7 Id. at 2419-20.
8 Id. Indeed, according to Professor Hal Scott, "ttlhe fact that the international unregulated
private placement market does not always demand [U.S.] public market documentation reveals that the
level of disclosure required by the United States is not optimal." Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of
Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 73 (Summer 2000).
9 Choi & Guzman, supra note 1, at 903.
10 Id. at 907.
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effects of regulatory competition." ProfessorJackson and Mr. Pan studied
European markets, where a form of regulatory competition "analogous to
what proponents of issuer choice are recommending for the United States"
already exists.' 2 They find that few issuers are registering in foreign
jurisdictions; most issuers prefer to focus the international aspects of their
offerings on institutional investors.' 3 The reason for this, according to
Professor Jackson and Mr. Pan's data, is that secondary market linkages
allow retail investors from all over Europe to purchase in the home market
of the issuer. 4 Therefore, issuers have little incentive to list on markets
outside of their homejurisdictions.'5 Furthermore, according to Professor
Jackson and Mr. Pan, many of the international components of European
offerings in question include a Rule 144A component. 6 Thus, U.S.
institutional investors have been able to participate in this market as well.
The extent of U.S. retail participation in this market is unclear, and that, of
course, is the subject of this article.'
7
The following parts analyze the rules surrounding U.S. retail purchases
of foreign securities. The background and basic functions of Regulation S
are discussed in Part II. Part III examines the details of how this regulation
controls U.S. activity abroad and addresses analytical problems that arise.
Furthermore, Part III puts Regulation S in context through a discussion of
Section 4(3) of the Securities Act and Rule 15a-6 of the Exchange Act. Part
IV samples market compliance with and understanding of the restrictions
presented in Part III; Part V concludes.
II. SUMMARY OF REGULATION S
This section briefly discusses the history of and purposes for enacting
Regulation S. It then provides a brief summary of the statute for those who
are unfamiliar with this aspect of the U.S. securities laws.
11 Jackson & Pan, supra note 1, at 653.
12 Id. at 661.
13 Id. at 654-55.
14 Id. at 655.
is Id.
16 Id. at 681.
17 Regulation S has been viewed by some "as a type of capital control, restricting the flow of
[U.S.] investor funds to foreign markets." Scott, supra note 8, at 100. This article concludes, however,
that any restriction on capital flow results from prohibitions against advertisement and solicitation.
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A. The History Behind and Purposes of Regulation S
Regulation S was first proposed in 1988 to clarify the Commission's
position with respect to the growing flow of international capital. 8
Specifically, the Commission sought to build upon the philosophy
expounded in its Release No. 4708, which concerned the distribution of
U.S. securities abroad.'9 In 1990, the Commission finalized Regulation S as
a safe harbor for distributions of securities made in foreign countries by both
foreign and domestic companies. 20 In 1998, however, Regulation S was
substantially modified to prevent U.S. companies from taking advantage of
the Regulation S safe harbor and making unregistered distributions into the
United States.2'
A Presidential Task Force charged with increasing foreign investment
in U.S. corporations spurred the Commission's initial foray into standard
setting in international waters.22 The Task Force recommended that the
Commission issue a release clarifying the reach of the Securities Act with
respect to U.S. securities aimed at foreign investors. 3 In addressing these
securities, the Commission stated the principle that the Securities Act did
not reach unregistered securities whose "distribution is ... effected in a
manner which will result in the securities coming to rest abroad. ,24 In the
18 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6779 (June 17, 1988).
19 Id.
20 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
Regulation S was reproposed in 1989 to incorporate a number of changes that stemmed from comment
letters followingthe Commission's 1988 proposal. Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No.
33-6838 (July 11, 1989).
21 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
Regulation S was modified substantively on one other occasion for the purpose of facilitating U.S. press
access to the press conferences of companies making unregistered distributions. Offshore Press
Conferences, Meetings with Company Representatives Conducted Offshore and Press-Related Materials
Released Offshore, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7470, 34-39227 (Oct. 17, 1997). See also Offshore
Press Conferences, Meetings with Company Representatives Conducted Offshore and Press-Related
Materials Released Offshore, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7356, 34-37803 (Oct. 18, 1996).
2 The Presidential Task Force on Promoting Increased Foreign Investment in United States
Corporate Securities and Increased Foreign Financing for United States Corporations OperatingAbroad
was appointed in October, 1963, as part ofan effort to decrease the U.S. balance of payments deficit and
to protect U.S. gold reserves. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of
Underwriters of Foreign Offerings as Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-4708, 34-7366
(July 9, 1964).
23 Id.
24 Id. At this time, the Commission focused on whether or not distributions targeted U.S.
nationals. See id.
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years that followed this release, the Commission expanded the scope of the
principle to foreign issuers distributing abroad as well.
25
In the years following Release No. 4708, global capital markets
underwent tremendous growth. From 1976 to 1986, the "international bond
market grew at a compound annual rate of 21%."2 6 Similarly, "Euroequity
offerings of common and preferred stock amounted to approximately $20
billion in 1987 compared to only about $200 million" in 1983.27 Investors
from around the world participated in this growth. In 1987, U.S. investors'
"purchases and sales of foreign stocks reached a record $187 billion," and
"foreign investors' activity in [U.S.] domestic corporate stock was a record
$481.5 billion."28  During this period, the Commission issued numerous
no-action letters to clarify its position concerning offshore offerings and
participation by U.S. investors.29 In the face of such growth, however, the
Commission undertook to construct a new set of regulations, known as
Regulation S.
The Commission built Regulation S "based on a territorial approach" to
securities regulation.30 Afterall, the Securities Act was designed to protect
U.S. securities markets and not foreign markets. Furthermore, principles
of comity dictated that the Commission "recognize[] the primacy of the
laws in which a market is located."3' With this understanding, the
Commission built Regulation S on three propositions. The first was the
principle ofcomity and the recognition that offerings of foreign issuers with
no substantial U.S. market interest would not have any effect on U.S.
markets.3 2 The second proposition was to "ensure against an indirect
distribution in the [U.S.] markets."33 Third, the Commission believed that
"periodic reporting under the Exchange Act [could] be relied upon for the
protection of investors once the marketing effort ha[d] been completed."34
25 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).




30 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
See also Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6779 (June 17, 1988). Professor Scott,
however, believes that Regulation S does not follow the territorial principle "because it restricts
participation of [U.S.] investors in offshore primary markets." Scott, supra note 8 at 71, 100. How and
if Regulation S does this is the subject of this article.
31 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
See also Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6779 (June 17, 1988).




In 1998, the Commission amended Regulation S to curb abuses by U.S.
corporations. The second proposition upon which the Commission had
based Regulation S had been violated. United States corporations were
making indirect distributions into the United States while bypassing the
registration requirements through the safe harbor of Regulation S. The
details of this amendment will be discussed below following a detailed
discussion of the rules of Regulation S.
Interestingly, the Commission only amended Regulation S with respect
to U.S. corporations and not with respect to foreign issuers. 5 There was
little evidence of any abuse of Regulation S by foreign issuers, and
commentators on the proposed rules strongly objected to extending the
amendments to foreign issuers.36 Their objections were grounded in the
difficulties that would be imposed upon foreign issuers by the change in
rules and the possible "strong disincentive for foreign companies to list their
securities on [U.S.] markets."
37
B. Regulation S
Regulation S provides a safe harbor for issuers making distributions
outside of the United States. The general statement of the safe harbor is
found in Rule 901 and excludes "offers and sales that occur outside the
United States" from the reach of Section 5 of the Securities Act.38 A
transaction is deemed to occur outside the United States when it meets
certain requirements. 39 Rules 903 and 904 lay out these requirements. Rule
903 pertains to primary distributions by issuers, distributors, and other
persons acting on their behalfi4 Rule 904 applies to resales made by persons
not covered under Rule 903.41 There are two global requirements for falling
within the safe-harbor, and they are, of course, incorporated into both Rules
903 and 904. The two global requirements are that the transaction must be
offshore and that no directed selling efforts be made into the United States. 42
The remaining requirements for falling within the Regulation S safe harbor
depend upon the nature of the securities being offered. The securities are
35 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.901 (2002).
39 Ifa sale or offer can be demonstrated to have been made outside of the United States, S 5 of
the Securities Act will not apply regardless ofwhether or not the requirements of Regulation S have been
met. Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
40 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903(a) (2002).
41 ld. at 230.904(a).
42 Id. at 5 230.903-4.
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divided into three categories, each with its own set of restrictions.43 These
categories are all defined in Rule 903, but the restrictions placed on each
category are different depending on whether a transaction is a primary
offering under Rule 903 or a resale under Rule 904.
1. OFFSHORE TRANSACTIONS AND DIRECTED SELLING EFFORTS
Both offerings and resales must meet the offshore transaction
requirement in order to be deemed to have occurred outside of the United
States.44 For a transaction to be considered offshore, the offer must not be
made to a person inside the United States.45 Specifically, when the buy
order is originated, the buyer must be physically outside the United States,
or the seller must reasonably believe that the buyer is outside the United
States.46 Instead of researching the location of the buyer, sellers may opt for
the alternative of executing an offering transaction "through a physical
trading floor of an established foreign securities exchange." 47 In the case of
resales, the seller may execute the transaction through any "designated
offshore securities market."48 In both of these situations, the location of the
buyer does not matter.
49
As stated above, unless the transaction occurs on the physical trading
floor of an established securities exchange or on a designated offshore
securities market, the buyer must be outside the United States for a
transaction to qualify as an offshore transaction under Rule 902(h). The
Commission has stated that in the event of a "buyer [who] is a corporation
or partnership .... an authorized employee [may] place[] the buy order
while abroad" and satisfy the offshore transaction requirement.0 This
should be contrasted with the definition of U.S. person in Rule 902(k).
U.S. persons are defined to include any "natural person," regardless of
43 Id.
4 Id.
45 Id. at § 230.902(h)(1)(i).
46 Id. at § 230.902(h)(1)(ii).
47 Id.
48 Id. The SEC has the power to designate such offshore securities markets. Id. at
§ 230.902(b) (2). Recently, the Berlin Stock Exchange and the Korea Stock Exchange have joined the list
of designated offshore securities markets. Berlin Stock Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 902 (Sept. 26,2000) and Korea Stock Exchange, SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 SEC No-
Act. LEXUS 849 (Sept. 11, 2000).
49 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902(h)(1)(ii) (2002).
50 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
See also EDWARD F. GREENE, ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND
DERIVATIVE MARKETS §S 5.02-5.03, 5-08 to 5-09 (5th ed. 2000).
INVESTING ABROAD
citizenship, "resident in the United States" and any "corporation organized
or incorporated under the laws of the United States."' Since the present
restriction does not utilize the term U.S. person, a domestic corporate entity
that falls within the Rule 902(k) definition of U.S. person would appear to
be allowed to purchase in an offshore transaction so long as its authorized
employee places the order abroad. The definition of U.S. person is not used
in this context but, instead, in other contexts including that of the
distribution compliance period imposed on Category 2 and Category 3
securities discussed below.
To be considered a transaction outside of the United States under Rule
901, the transaction also must not be accompanied by any directed selling
efforts into the United States. 2 Directed selling efforts is defined as
anything that "could reasonably be expected to have the effect of" or the
purpose of "conditioning the market in the United States" for the offered
securities.13 This includes advertising in publications generally circulated in
the United States.54 There are specific circulation numbers for defining
such publications, and tombstone advertisements are permitted to be printed
in some globally circulated publications provided that less than 20% of the
circulation is in the United States and that other maximum information
requirements are met.5
Aside from these traditional modes of targeting investors, the
Commission has also promulgated guidelines for offerings made on the
Internet. 6 Foreign issuers should include a prominent disclaimer on their
web site that the offering is not intended for people in the United States.
General disclaimers about the offer only being valid in places where it would
be legal are insufficient, and the disclaimer "must be on the same screen as
the offering material" or "be viewed before a person can view the offering
materials." 57 Furthermore, the issuer has to implement "procedures that are
reasonably designed to guard against sales to [U.S.] persons in the offshore
51 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902(k)(ii) (2002). See also Greene, et
al., supra note 50, at §§ 5.02-5.03, 5-17.
52 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903-4 (2002).
53 Id. at § 230.902(c)(1).
54 Id.
5s Id. at S 230.9 02(c)(2)-(3). Section 902(c)(3)(iii)(C) restricts the amount of information that
may be printed on a tombstone advertisement. Acts permitted by the provisions on directed selling
efforts are further detailed in Part Ill(D) of this article in conjunction with other regulations pertaining
to solicitation.
56 Statement ofthe Commission Regarding Use oflnternet Web Sites to Offer Securities, Solicit
Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7516,
34-39779 (Mar. 23, 1998).
57 Id.
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offering."5 8  United States issuers must take more stringent safeguards
because of the strong possibility of flowback, the heightened expectation by
investors that U.S. laws will apply, and the substantial contacts that such
issuers have to the United States. 9 The Commission advises U.S. issuers
to include "password-type procedures... designed to ensure that only non-
[U.S.] persons can obtain access to the offer."'
2. THREE CATEGORIES
Regulation S divides securities into three categories, each with a
different set of requirements for both offerings and resales.6' Category 1 is
the most lenient and imposes no further restrictions than the two global
requirementsjust discussed. 62 There are four ways securities can qualify for
Category 1 status. First, securities are considered Category 1 securities if
they are issued by a foreign issuer that "reasonably believes at the
commencement of the offering" that there is "no substantial [U.S.] market
interest" in those securities.63 Substantial U.S. market interest is defined, for
equity securities, by trading volume in the United States and, for debt
securities, by holders of record who are U.S. persons.' 4 Second, securities
of a foreign issuer and non-convertible debt securities of a domestic issuer
are Category 1 securities if they are directed into "a single country other than
the United States" and made according to "the local laws and customary
practices and documentation of such country."6s Third, securities "backed
by the full faith and credit of a foreign government" are Category 1
securities.66 Finally, securities that are "offered and sold to employees of the
issuer.., pursuant to an employee benefit plan" that meets certain require-
ments limiting the distribution to employees are Category 1 securities.6
Category 2 securities have more restrictions than Category 1 securities.
Securities that are eligible for Category 2 status are equity securities of a
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. Internet solicitation is discussed further in Part Ill(D) of this article.
61 While the three groupings were always a part of Regulation S, the SEC officially adopted the
captions of "Category 1," "Category 2," and "Category 3" as part of the 1998 amendments. Offshore
Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
6 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.9034 (2002).
63 Id. at S 230.903(b)(1)(i).
64 Id. at S 230.9026). This is also an example of the use of the term U.S. person as defined in
S 230.902(k).
65 Id. at § 230. 903(b)(1)(ii).
6 Id. at § 230.903(b)(1)(iii).
67 Id. at S 230.903(b)(1)(iv).
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reporting foreign issuer, debt securities of a reporting issuer, and debt
securities of a non-reporting foreign issuer.
68
In addition to the global requirements discussed above, issuers of
Category 2 securities must agree in writing to abide by both Rules 903 and
904. Furthermore, all offering materials must contain statements "to the
effect that the securities have not been registered under the [Securities] Act
and may not be offered or sold in the United States or to [U.S.] persons. " 69
Such statements must appear in highly visible places such as the cover of the
prospectus or offering circular."0
Category 2 securities are also subject to a forty-day distribution
compliance period.71 The distribution compliance period begins upon the
closing of the offering or upon the first offering of securities to "persons
other than distributors," whichever is later.72  During this forty-day
compliance period, Category 2 securities are not to be sold to U.S. persons
regardless of reasonable belief on the part of the seller.73 In the case of
resales, however, dealers are allowed to sell to U.S. persons so long as they
do not know that the offeree or buyer is a U.S. person.74 During the
distribution compliance period, a distributor who sells Category 2 securities
to another distributor or dealer must notify the purchaser that these
restrictions also apply to the purchaser.75
Category 3 securities carry the most stringent restrictions. Category 3
securities include any securities that are not eligible for Categories 1 and 2.76
This means equity offerings of non-reporting foreign issuers where there is
a substantial U.S. market interest in the securities offered, debt offerings of
non-reporting U.S. issuers, and equity offerings of all U.S. issuers. As a
practical matter, "[vjery few, if any, offerings of foreign issuers will fall into
this category. " T
As with both of the other categories, the transactions involving Category
3 securities must be offshore, and there must be no directed selling efforts.
78
68 Id. at S 230.903(b)(2).
6 Id. at Rule 903(b)(2); S 230.90 2(g)(2).
70 Id. at S 230.903(b)(2); Id. at S 23 0.902(g).
71 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903(b)(2) (2002).
72 Id. at § 230.902(0.
73 Id. at S 230.903(b)(2).
74 Id. at S 230.904(b). As noted above, in this context, the restriction is against selling to U.S.
persons as defined in § 230.902(k), and sales to offshore authorized employees of U.S. corporations are
not exempt.
75 Id. at S 230.903(b)(2).
76 Id. at S 230.903(b)(3).
77 Greene, et al., supra note 50, at 5§ 5.02, 5-18.
78 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903(a) (2002); Commodity and
2002]
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In addition, as with Category 2 securities, issuers of Category 3 securities
must agree in writing to abide by Rules 903 and 904 and print cautionary
statements against offers and sales to U.S. persons on all offering materials.79
Category 3 debt securities are subject to a forty-day distribution compliance
period while Category 3 equity securities are subject to a one-year
distribution compliance period.'
During this distribution compliance period, securities are not to be sold
to U.S. persons regardless of reasonable belief, but as with Category 2
securities, dealers who resell are allowed to resell to U.S. persons so long as
they have no knowledge that the purchasers are U.S. persons.81
Furthermore, during the distribution compliance period, purchasers of
securities must certify that they are not U.S. persons and agree to resell
Category 3 securities "only in accordance with the provisions of...
Regulation S."2 Additionally, issuers of Category 3 securities must, "either
by contract or a provision in its bylaws, articles, [or] charter... refuse to
register any transfer of securities-not made in accordance" with Regulation
S or the Securities Act.' Any distributor who sells Category 3 securities to
another distributor or dealer within the compliance period must notify that
purchaser that the purchaser is also subject to the restrictions of Regulation
S.84 Securities of domestic issuers must bear a legend stating that transfers
must be made in accordance to Regulation S and that hedging transactions
are not to be conducted."5 Debt securities must be represented by a global
security until the end of the compliance period and, at that time, exchanged
for definitive securities only after certifications are made that the transaction
does not violate Regulation S.86
In 1998, equity securities of domestic reporting issuers were moved
from Category 2 to Category 3 because of abuses by domestic corporations. 7
The Commission found that a number of domestic reporting issuers were
Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.904(a) (2002).
79 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903(b)(3) (2002); Commodity and
Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902(g) (2002).
80 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903(b)(3) (2002).
81 Id. at S 230.903(b)(3) and S 230.904(b). Again, in this context, the restriction applies to U.S.
persons as defined in S 230.902(k).
8 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903(b)(3) (2002).
8o Id.
84 Id.
8s Id. For issuers whose securities are uncertificated, this requirement may be satisfied "by any
means which puts holders and subsequent purchasers on notice of the applicable resale restrictions."
Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
86 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903(b)(3) (2002).
97 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
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parking equity securities with offshore affiliates who then sold the securities
into the United States after the forty-day distribution compliance period.8
The proceeds from the U.S. sales were sent to the issuer.a9 Such schemes
generally involved the use of non-recourse notes, recourse notes issued by
entities with minimal or no assets, steep discounts on the price of the
securities, and/or hedging transactions such as short-selling and option
writing.9
In order to curb such abuses, the Commission made a number of
amendments to Regulation S. First, the Commission moved the equity
securities of domestic reporting companies from Category 2 to Category 3
and lengthened the distribution compliance period for equity securities of
domestic companies from forty days to one year.91 The longer period is
intended to prevent sales of such securities back into the United States.
92
The Commission also amended the rules so purchasers of equity securities
of domestic issuers are not allowed to engage in hedging transactions with
respect to those securities during the distribution compliance period.93 The
Commission also made equity securities of all domestic corporations
"restricted securities" under the definition of Rule 144.94 In so doing, the
Commission hoped to "provide... clear guidance regarding when and how
[such Regulation S] securities may be resold in the United States."9) United
States equity securities, then, "may be resold, after the expiration of the one-
year distribution compliance period, to a [U.S.] person in reliance on the
safe harbor provided by Rule 144, which allows ... unlimited resales by
non-affiliates" of the issuer two years after the distribution.96 Furthermore,
the Commission clarified that resales under Rule 904 could not wash offthe
restricted status of such securities. 7




91 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
92 Id. As stated above, this move only applied to domestic issuers and not to foreign issuers.
93 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902(g)(1)(ii) (2002).
94 Id. at § 230.905.
95 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
% Greene, et al., supra note 50, at SS 5.02-03, 5-25.
Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.905 (2002). See also, Offshore Offers
and Sales, Exchange Act Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998). Incidentally,
Category 2 securities are not considered restricted, so there are no restrictions to wash off.
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III. A CLOSE READING OF REGULATION S AND ITS UNDERLYING
POLICIES
Under the Securities Act, there are only two possible sources of
restrictions on U.S. investors purchasing Category 1 securities. The first is
Regulation S itself, and the second is Section 4(3) of the Securities Act.
Under Regulation S, U.S. residents who wish to purchase Category 1
securities must do so either through the physical trading floor of an
established foreign securities exchange or on a designated foreign securities
market.98 In addition, Section 4(3) of the Securities Act may impose a forty-
day waiting period on U.S. residents unless the U.S. residents' brokers can
qualify for a Section 4(4) exemption under the Securities Act. How these
brokers may qualify for a Section 4(4) exemption is not clear, but the policy
rationale underlying the Commission's use of separate categorizations seems
to support the application of Section 4(4) to such situations. Furthermore,
Rule 15a-6 of the Exchange Act may force U.S. residents to trade through
registered brokers, thereby giving the Commission some control over U.S.
trading of Category 1 securities. A closer examination of this rule, however,
appears to indicate that such is often not the case.
Figure 1, below, diagrams the transactions that will concern this section.
On the left, the column is labeled "Primary" to indicate a primary market
transaction in which a U.S. investor purchases Category 1 securities directly
during the offering. The column on the right depicts a resale transaction
where an U.S. investor purchases from another securities holder. The
dotted line between "Foreign Issuer/Distributor" and "Seller" indicates that
the seller in a resale may have bought the securities as part of the primary
offering. The dotted lines leading from "Broker (foreign)" to "U.S. buyer"
indicate that U.S. residents may contact foreign brokers directly. In most
circumstances, however, U.S. residents wishing to purchase a foreign
securitywill contact a U.S. broker, and the U.S. brokerwill contact a foreign
broker to execute the transaction on a foreign exchange. The foreign broker
often may be an affiliate of the U.S. broker. The foreign broker or affiliate
represents a necessary step because, in most instances, only foreign entities
have seats on, or are members of, the foreign exchange.






Bro er (foreign) Broker (foreign)
Established Foreign Designated Offshore
Securitie Exchange Securities Market ,
Broker (foreign) - F- Broker (foreign)
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US~ buyer I I Ser
A. Regulation S
Under Rules 902,903, and 904 of Regulation S, U.S. residents may only
purchase securities on the "trading floor of an established foreign securities
exchange that is located outside the United States" or through "the facilities
of a designated offshore securities market."99 Primary offerings of Category
1 securities are deemed to be offshore when the "offer is not made to a
person in the United States" and when either the "buyer is outside of the
United States" or the transaction occurs on the "physical trading floor of an
established foreign securities exchange."1 °° Therefore, a U.S. resident who
wishes to partake in a primary offering of Category 1 securities and is located
in the United States can only purchase the securities on the trading floor of
99 Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902 (2002).
to Id. at S 230.903; see id. at § 230.902. Additionally, the definition in Rule 902(h) provides that,
where the transaction does not occur on an established foreign securities exchange, a buyer need not be
truly outside of the United State, but the seller need only reasonably believe that the buyer is outside of
the United States.
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a foreign securities exchange.'' This is illustrated in the left column of
Figure 1.102 To the extent that issuers infrequently make offerings directly
on to an exchange, however, this route often may be closed to U.S. buyers.0 3
The regulatory mechanism for resales of Category 1 securities works
similarly to that for primary offerings. There is only one slight difference;
Rule 902(h) provides that, for resales, transactions may be executed through
the facilities of a designated offshore securities market instead of the stricter
requirement that trading occur on the floor of an established foreign
securities exchange."° Therefore, a U.S. resident wishingto purchase Cate-
gory 1 securities outside the United States must do so through a designated
offshore securities market as illustrated in the right column of Figure 1.105
It should be noted that, like all other securities, resales of Category 1
securities may be made into the United States when any other exemption
applies. The simplest case would involve individual foreign investors using
the Section 4(1) exemption, where the transaction does not involve any
issuer, underwriter, or dealer. There would be no U.S. market, however,
in which to make such a transaction, particularly when brokers fall under the
Securities Act's definition of dealer in Section 2(a)(12). Other exemptions
entail the same complications that Regulation S was intended to avoid, and
most sellers would likely opt for the safe harbor of selling offshore. There-
fore, a U.S. resident wishing to purchase Category 1 securities through a
101 The requirement that the transaction be executed on a physical trading floor has never been
explained by the Commission. Daniel A. Braverman, U.S. Legal Considerations Affecting Global Offerings
of Shares in Foreign Companies, 17 NW.J. INT'L L.& BuS. 30, n.177 (1996). Furthermore, it appears to
have been relaxed in practice. For example, EASDAQ is an electronic exchange that does not have a
physical trading floor but is allowed to participate in Rule 903 offerings pursuant to a Commission no-
action letter. The European Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation N.V/S.A.,
("EASDAQ"), SEC No-Action Letter, SEC No-Act. LEXIS 652 (July 27, 1999). Therefore, unless
otherwise necessary, future references to this requirement will be shortened to the use of the term
established foreign securities exchange."
102 Part IV(D) of the article provides a description of how one foreign exchange handles these
primary offerings in light of the restrictions of Regulation S.
103 See Scott, supra note 8, at 71, 93; Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-
6863,34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990). An alternate route, through the use of nominee entities, may exist for
U.S. residents wishing to purchase foreign primary offerings, and that route is discussed in subsection
E(3) of this Part of the Article.
104 Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902 (2002); See supra note 101
(proposing, as discussed in note 101, the requirement that primary offerings to U.S. residents occur on
a physical trading floor may have been relaxed).
10s Apparently, some U.S. brokers make markets in foreign securities through transactions similar
to pink sheet transactions, so the need for designated offshore securities markets may be undercut in
some circumstances. This issue is presented briefly in Parts IV(B) and (C) the article. Part IV(D)
contains a description of how one foreign exchange handles these resale transactions.
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resale will usually do so through the transaction diagramed in the right
column of Figure 1.
Since Rule 902(h) of the Securities Act prohibits the sale of securities
directly into the United States, the only routes contemplated by Regulation
S as being available to U.S. residents for purchasing Category 1 securities are
those illustrated in Figure 1.106 So long as U.S. residents follow these two
routes, there are no other restrictions within the text of Regulation S against
the sale of Category 1 securities to U.S. residents.
B. Sections 4(3) and 4(4)'07
Section 4(3) of the Securities Act provides another possible restriction
106 The possibility of U.S. investors trading through nominee entities is discussed in subsection
E(3) of this section. Additionally, the possibility of utilizing U.S. market makers in "pink sheet"
transactions is touched upon in sections IV(B) and (C) of the article.
107 Section 4(3) analysis in this article reflects an important difference between Regulation S and
other transactional exemptions promulgated by the Commission. Most, if not all, other transactional
exemptions are grounded in § 3 and 4 of the Securities Act. See LOUIS LOSS &JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS x-xii (3d ed. 1999) (providing a list of transactional exemptions). These
sections are not subject to the limitations of S 4(3). Regulation S, however, is based on a territorial
approach to securities regulation and is grounded primarily in S 19 of the Securities Act. See Offshore
Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990). While the enacting
release lists §§ 2, 3, 4, and 19 as the statutory basis of Regulation S, neither the preliminary notes, nor
the body of the release actually specify the statutory grounding of Regulation S. See id. Section 19's
reach is broad and allows the Commission to issue regulations as "necessary to carry out the provisions
of" the Securities Act, but it does not explicitly exempt Regulation S from the reach ofS 4(3). See 15
USCS § 77s (2001).
The other transactional registration safe-harbors are grounded in SS 3 and 4 and are thereby
outside the reach ofS 4(3). Section 3(a) states that "the provisions ofthis title shall not apply to any of
the following classes ofsecurities." 15 USCS S 77c (2001). This explicitly negates any prohibition that
S 4(3) may impose on safe-harbor exemptions based on S 3. An example would be Rule 147, which is
the intrastate offering exemption. See Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.147
(2002). Rule 147 provides "objective standards" that allow issuers to know exactly when they qualify for
the S 3(a)(11) exemption. Id. Issuers who meet the requirements of Rule 147 are then considered to be
making an exempt offering under the S 3(a)(11) exemption. Given the general language ofS 3(a), the
transaction will not be subject to any of§ 4's requirements.
Furthermore, § 3(b) gives the Commission the power to "add any class of securities to the
securities exempted as provided in this section." 15 USCS S 77c (2001). This effectively links § 3(b)
exemptions to § 3 (a) and removes them from the reach ofS 4(3). For this reason, safe-harbors such as
Regulation A and Rule 701 are not subject to the constraints of§ 4(3). See Commodities and Securities
Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 203.251 (2002). Rule 251 andJAMES D. Cox ETAL., SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 421 (2d ed. 1997). Though the language of Regulation A is very similar to that
of Regulation S, those who seek the shelter of Regulation A effectively seek the shelter of S 3(b). Once
they meet the requirements of Regulation A and have the protection ofS 3(b), they are protected from
all other sections of the Securities Act, including both §§ 4 and 5. Rule 701 operates similarly. See, e.g.,
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on U.S. residents partaking in the public offerings of Category 1 issuers.
10 8
Edward F. Greene, in his treatise on international securities and derivatives
markets, writes that Section 4(3) of the Securities Act applies to Regulation
S offerings so that, "even in the case of a Category I offering,.., dealers are
subject to the limitations of" Section 4(3).'09 The analysis in this article,
however, indicates that Section 4(3) most likely does not pose a barrier to
Category 1 offerings. Furthermore, Section 4(4) of the Securities Act
appears to provide an alternate exemption that would allow U.S. residents
to purchase Category 1 securities with only the restrictions imposed by
Regulation S.
Section 4(3) applies the prohibitions and requirements of Section 5 of
the Securities Act to transactions involving dealers within forty days of the
offering."0 The term dealer is defined broadly by the Securities Act and
includes entities that are commonly known as brokers and whose business
involves trading in the securities of others. 1" Referring to Figure 1, one can
see that any transaction within the confines of Regulation S requires the use
of brokers that fall under the definition of dealer in the Securities Act. Thus,
Mr. Greene has interpreted this combination of provisions to prohibit a
dealer from selling Category 1 securities to U.S. residents within forty days
of the offering."1
2
The following analysis shows that such is not the case. There are two
sets of brokers in Figure 1: one set of brokers on the seller's side of the
JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 421 (2d ed. 1997).
Section 4 exemptions, ofcourse, are parallel to S 4(3). As long as a transaction falls into one
of those exemptions, it is exempt without having to meet the requirements of other subsections of§ 4.
An example would be the private offering safe-harbor provisions found in Regulation D. When issuers
meet the requirements ofRule 506, they are deemed to be making a private offering"within the meaning
of S 4(2) of the [Securities] Act." Therefore, the transaction would not be subject to S 4(3). See
Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.506 (2002).
Regulation S does not appear to have a similar statutory grounding, so S 4(3) poses a concern.
Furthermore, one must remember that these are all transactional exemptions, so purchasers in these
exempt transactions must find their own exemption upon resale.
108 Indeed, in the adopting release of Regulation S, the Commission made clear that Regulation
S "does not affect the availability of the exemptions contained in" SS 4(1) and 4(3) of the Securities Act.
Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 at n.137 (Apr. 24, 1990).
109 Greene et al., supra note 50, at SS 5.02-03, 5-27.
110 Section 4(3) of the Securities Act. Incidentally, S 4(3) imposes a ninety-day waiting period
for securities of first-time issuers who have filed a registration statement and whose securities thereby
fall under S 4(3)(B) of the Securities Act. For purposes of Regulation S, however, no issuer will have
filed a registration statement.
i 15 USCS S 78(i) (2001).
112 See Greene et al., supra note 50, at SS 5.02-03, 5-27; See also Scott, supra note 8, at 71, 92-93;
Daniel A. Braverman, U.S. Legal Considerations Affeaing Global Offerings of Shares in Foreign Companies, 17
Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 30, 84-85 (1996).
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market and a second set on the buyer's side. The brokers on the seller's side
of the transaction should be exempt from Section 4(3) of the Securities Act.
Section 4(3) of the Securities Act is an exemption from Section 5 of the
Securities Act. Regulation S provides that Section 5 does not apply to
transactions that fall within the safe harbor. Rule 901 of Regulation S states
that "For the purposes only of Section 5 of the [Securities] Act, the terms
'offer,' 'offer to sell,' 'sell,' 'sale,' and 'offer to buy' ... shall be deemed not
to include offers and sales that occur outside the United States." Therefore,
if the transaction meets the requirements ofRegulation S, Section 5 does not
apply, so Section 4(3) is meaningless as an exemption from Section 5.113
One would expect the Regulation S safe harbor to cover the entire
transaction, but the possibility of separating the two sets of brokers exists." 4
Indeed, if the buyer's brokers, whether foreign or U.S., first purchase the
Category 1 securities and then sell them to the buyer, Preliminary Note 6
to Regulation S may be implicated. Preliminary Note 6 states that any
securities "acquired overseas... may be resold in the United States only if
they are registered under the [Securities] Act or an exemption from
registration is available." Furthermore, even if the buyer's brokers do not
actually purchase the securities but merely facilitate the transaction, the
buyer's brokers may still be knowingly sending the securities into the
United States. Buyer's brokers then require an exemption if the Regulation
S safe harbor does not reach them.
Section 4(4) of the Securities Act may be available to buyer's brokers.
Section 4(4) grants an exemption from Section 5 of the Securities Act for
transactions that are executed by a broker "upon customers' orders" where
such orders were not solicited by the broker."5 Since the definition of
dealer is broad enough to include all brokers, the "Section 4(4) exemption
depends not upon a firm's generally acting as a broker but upon the capacity
in which it executes the particular transaction."" 6 Furthermore, the Section
4(4) exemption is only necessary when the Section 4(3) dealers' exemption
is not available, such as when the transaction occurs within forty days of the
issuance of the security." 7 If the Section 4(4) exemption is available to
brokers executing buy orders on foreign markets, there would be no
prohibitions against U.S. residents purchasing Category 1 securities upon
their issuance through an established foreign securities exchange or on a
designated offshore securities market.
113 See Jackson & Pan, supra note 1, at 654.
114 See id.
115 15 USCS S 77d (2001).
116 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 107, at S 3-C-8.
117 Id.
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The Section 4(4) exemption should be available to brokers executing
buy orders on behalf of U.S. clients. The history of Section 4(4) implies
that the exemption is intended to benefit buyers. The House committee
explained that Section 4(4) allowed innocent purchasers of the securities of
an issuer to sell those securities even when a stop order has been imposed
against further distribution of those securities.'18 Indeed, "[i]n adopting
Rule 144, the Commission made clear, 'The broker may not solicit buy
orders....' This seems to be.. . consistent with the statutory emphasis on
protection of the purchaser."'19 So long as U.S. purchasers contact brokers,
there should be no Securities Act violations.
The mechanics of Rule 144 and Section 4(4) also support such an
interpretation of the exemption. Rule 144(g) defines the term "brokers'
transactions" as used in Section 4(4) for purposes of Rule 144.12° Under the
Rule 144 interpretation of Section 4(4), brokers are permitted to work for
buyers and to receive their commission from buyers, "as long as the
commission is limited to the 'usual and customary brokers' commission."1
21
Rule 144(g)(ii) states that brokers are allowed to contact their customers
who have indicated interest in a security in the past ten business days.
22
Furthermore, the Commission "permit[s] a broker to solicit affiliates of an
issuer to sell their securities.
"1
If the Rule 144 interpretation of section 4(4) applies to the Regulation
S context, U.S. purchasers will have no legal barriers to acquiring Category
1 securities. United States purchasers would simply contact brokers and
place buy orders. In the event that the securities are not available, brokers
can contact the interested buyers when the securities become available on an
established foreign securities exchange or designated offshore securities
market if that happens within ten days. Brokers, however, may not actually
be able to solicit affiliates of the issuer in the Regulation S context because
Rules 904 and 902 state that sellers must reasonably believe that buyers are
outside the United States. If U.S. brokers contacted distributors, these
distributors would know that any sales would be made for the benefit of a
118 Id.
119 Id. (footnotes omitted).
120 Rule 14 4 (g) defines brokers' transactions "[foor the purposes of both Rule 144(0 and 5 4(4)."
Loss & Seligman, supra note 107, at S 3-D-2 (emphasis added). The actual statute, however, indicates
that the definition in Rule 144 is only intended "for the purposes of this rule." Commodities and
Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.144 (2002). Rule 144(g) is, "implicitly, . . . the current
Commission interpretation of S 4(4)" because Rule 144 replaced Rule 154, which had defined S 4(4).
Loss & Seligman, supra note 107, at S 3-C-8 1565, 1567.
121 Loss & Seligman, supra note 107, at S 3-D-2 (footnote omitted).
122 Id.; See also Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.144 (2002).
123 Loss & Seligman supra note 107, at S 3-D-2.
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U.S. resident. Therefore, not every aspect ofthe Rule 144 interpretation of
a broker's transaction can be made applicable to Regulation S.
Though the full Rule 144 interpretation of Section 4(4) may not be
applicable to the Regulation S context, those areas that do not conflict
directly with Regulation S should apply. Application of the Rule 144
interpretation of Section 4(4) to Regulation S would be consistent with the
purchaser protection objectives of the exemption; in the Regulation S
context, the broker acts on behalf of the buyer. Furthermore, Regulation S
expressly states that Rule 144's definition of restricted securities applies to
domestic equity securities issued pursuant to Regulation S.114  The
Commission's intent is to use Rule 144 as a structured method by which
purchasers of domestic equity securities may sell those securities back into
the United States. 5 Even though Rule 144(g) is a part of an integrated and
intricate set of rules, to use disparate definitions of the Section 4(4)
exemption for Rule 144 and Regulation S would seem anomalous and
unwarranted given the express and intricately balanced linkages between
these rules. Therefore, the Rule 144 interpretation of Section 4(4) should
be applied to Regulation S transactions to the fullest extent possible.
Allowing U.S. purchasers to contact brokers for purchasing Category 1
securities on an established foreign securities exchange or designated
offshore securities market is consistent with both the history and the
Commission's reading of Section 4(4). Therefore, brokers who do not
actively market Category 1 securities to their customers but who are
requested by their customers to purchase such securities on a foreign market
should be free of any restrictions of the Securities Act.
126
C. Rule 15a-6
While the Securities Act appears to allow U.S. investors to purchase
securities abroad with few restrictions, the Exchange Act presents another,
less direct, method of regulating such transactions. As discussed above,
Regulation S forces most U.S. residents wishing to purchase Category 1
securities to do so through an established foreign securities exchange or
designated offshore securities market. This requires U.S. residents to
purchase such securities through brokers as depicted in Figure 1. The
Exchange Act requires broker-dealers to register with the Commission.
This, then, presents an alternate, though less direct, route through which the
124 Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.905 (2002).
125 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
126 Part IV this article presents anecdotal evidence that S 4(3) is not a concern to professionals in
the financial industry.
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Commission can regulate transactions of U.S. investors in foreign
securities.
127
Rule 15a-6 provides an exemption from the registration requirements
of the Exchange Act for foreign broker-dealers. Foreign brokers that meet
the requirements of this rule are allowed to do business with U.S. investors
without registration. Should U.S. investors buy foreign securities through
such foreign brokers, the transaction would again be completely unregulated
by the Commission.
A brief description of Rule 15a-6 is in order. The enacting release for
Rule 15a-6 discussed the exemption in terms of two different types of
contacts between foreign broker-dealers and U.S. persons: non-direct and
direct. Non-direct contacts include unsolicited transactions for U.S.
investors, discussed below, and the provision of research to major U.S.
institutional investors. 128 The Commission does not consider the provision
of research reports as direct contact because broker-dealers providing such
reports are not permitted to initiate contact with investors to follow up on
the reports and because the report itself must not recommend the use of the
broker-dealer." "Major" U.S. institutional investors are defined to be U.S.
institutional investors with assets, or assets under management, of more than
$100 million.' 3 This exemption was created because of a desire on the part
of U.S. institutional investors to access foreign research and because of the
Commission's belief that this position is "consistent with the free flow of
information across national boundaries... [and that the exemption does
not] rais[e] substantial investor protection concerns."
131
Under the enacting release to Rule 15a-6, direct contacts between
foreign broker-dealers and U.S. investors fall into two categories. First,
solicitation of U.S. institutional investors constitutes direct contact and is
permitted so long as transactions with or for these investors are executed
through a registered intermediary. Second, transactions with "registered
broker-dealers, banks acting [as broker-dealers], certain international
organizations, foreign persons temporarily present in the United States,
[U.S.] citizens resident abroad, and foreign branches and agencies of [U.S.]
127 Part IV(C) discusses how two U.S. broker-dealers accommodate U.S. residents who wish to
purchase securities abroad.
128 Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27017
(July 11, 1989).
129 Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 240.15a-6 (2002). Registration
Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27017 Uuly 11, 1989).
130 Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 240.15a-6 (2002).
13 Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27017
Uuly 11, 1989).
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persons" are permitted. 32 The use of a registered intermediary is intended
by the Commission as a method of maintaining some regulatory safeguards;
the registered intermediary bears responsibility for a number of the
transactional requirements of registered broker-dealers even though the
intermediary itself is merely a conduit.'33 The second set of direct contact
exemptions incorporate prior no-action letters and make the rule consistent
with other rules and regulations." 4
For purposes of Regulation S, the primary concern is with the
exemption for unsolicited transactions embodied in Rule 15a-6(a)(1).
Under Rule 15a-6(a) (1), so long as the U.S. investor initiates the transaction,
the broker-dealer does not have to register. 3 ' This is because the
Commission believes that, in such situations, U.S. investors would not
expect the foreign broker-dealers to be subject to U.S. broker-dealer
requirements. 36 Furthermore, the Commission also believes that, in such
situations, requiring registration would cause foreign broker-dealers to
refuse to deal with U.S. persons under any circumstances. 37 Such a result
seemingly would hurt U.S. investors by preventing those who
knowledgeably want to invest abroad from doing so.
So long as foreign broker-dealers do not solicit U.S. investors, U.S.
investors may invest in securities abroad through unregistered broker-
dealers and thereby bypass all forms of U.S. regulation.
D. Contacts and Solicitation
The main thrust of the Commission's restrictions on investment in
unregistered foreign securities appears to be aimed at preventing advertising
and solicitation from reaching U.S. residents. As has been demonstrated
above, U.S. residents are free to contact brokers, U.S. or foreign, and invest
in foreign securities through established foreign securities exchanges and
designated offshore securities markets. They can only do this, however, if
they know about an offshore offering. Accordingly, each of the three
regulations described above has incorporated provisions that restrict contact
between foreign sellers or brokers and U.S. investors. Under Regulation S,




13 A more detailed description of what constitutes solicitation under Rule 15a-6(a)(1) is below.
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into the United States, nor are they allowed to make offers into the United
States. In Section 4(4), the brokers' transaction must be unsolicited.
Similarly, under Rule 15a-6(a)(1), brokers do not have to register if the
transaction is unsolicited. This section seeks to compare the three different
provisions and determine the limits of interaction between foreign sellers
and brokers and U.S. investors.
One begins with Regulation S. The limits of Regulation S apply to
issuers and underwriters of securities and prohibit any offers to U.S.
persons. 138 Presumably, since the Commission has not specifically defined
the term "offer" for purposes of Regulation S, that term would have a similar
definition in this context as it would have for purposes of Section 5 of the
Securities Act. Support for this presumption may be found in the
Commission's release on internet offers, where they assume that
information posted on a web site would "constitute an 'offer' within the
meaning of Section 5(c) of the Securities Act and Regulation S." 139 At least
for Internet purposes, then, Regulation S offers appear to be the same as
Section 5 offers.
While the Commission has not defined offers for Regulation S offerings
in general, the Commission has promulgated specific suggestions
concerning offshore offers made over the Internet. The Commission
recommends that issuers and distributors include prominent disclaimers
stating that an Internet offer is not intended for U.S. persons. Furthermore,
web sites should include procedures, such as getting a potential purchaser's
address, that guard against sales to U.S. persons.' 4°
Some of the ambiguity concerning what constitutes an offer for non-
Internet related distributions might be clarified by the second restriction of
Regulation S. This restriction is against directed selling efforts into the
United States. Those acts specifically made available to foreign issuers
under that restriction, presumably, would not constitute an offer to a U.S.
person. The acts made available to foreign issuers and distributors follow:
1) advertisements required by U.S. or foreign law provided that the
advertisement includes no more information than that required by
law;
2) tombstone advertisements in publications with less than 20% of
their circulation in the United States;
138 Much of the statutory detail was provided in Part II(B)(1).
139 Statement ofthe Commission Regarding Use oflnternetWeb Sites to Offer Securities, Solicit
Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7516,
34-39779 (Mar. 23, 1998). Internet offers were also discussed in Part II(B)(1).
140 Id.
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3) visits of investors to facilities in the United States;
4) distribution of a foreign broker-dealer's quotations as part of a
third-party system that distributes such quotations primarily in
foreign countries;
5) notices in accordance with Rules 135 and 135c; and
6) access for U.S. journalists to press conferences held outside the
United States. 4
These acts are explicitly permitted by the Commission as acts that do not
constitute directed marketing efforts. They also, presumably, would not
constitute offers to U.S. persons since the Commission has explicitly
condoned them. Similarly, offer rules also help define what constitutes a
directed marketing effort. The internet restrictions that prevent a web site
from becoming an offer into the United States may also prevent the web site
from being deemed a directed marketing effort into the United States. This
is because, in the context of web sites, the Commission focuses on
determining when "offshore [i] nternet offers to which [U.S.] persons can
gain access [are deemed] not to occur in the United States." 142 Web sites
that do not occur in the United States are, by definition, not in the United
States and seemingly would not be considered directed marketing efforts
into the United States. The Commission's release is, however, limited to
offers specifically.
The restrictions on offers and directed marketing efforts are not entirely
coextensive. Acts that would not constitute directed marketing efforts might
be considered offers. Specifically, acts that aim at particular individuals or
groups may be considered "offers for purposes of Regulation S or solicitation
for purposes of Rule 15a-6, [but] they generally will not constitute directed
selling efforts for purposes of... Regulation [S] because of their confined
effect."' 43 Isolating marketing efforts that will not be considered offers,
however, is difficult if not impossible. The term "offer" is broadly defined
in Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act to "include every attempt ... to
dispose of ... a security . . for value." Thus, potentially all marketing
efforts can also be viewed as offers, and the internet restrictions discussed in
the prior paragraph would apply widely.
141 Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902 (2002).
142 Statement ofthe Commission Regarding Use ofinternet Web Sites to Offer Securities, Solicit
Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7516,
34-39779 (Mar. 23, 1998).
143 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
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The prohibition on solicitation in Section 4(4), which is necessary for
a U.S. person to buy foreign securities, is unfortunately also not clear.'"
Registered brokers are allowed to advertise themselves as brokers, and that
distinction will become critical below. 45 Aside from that obvious ability, the
prohibition against solicitation is embodied in Rule 144(g), as discussed
above. Briefly, a registered broker falling under the Section 4(4) exemption
may do the following-
1) execute a sell order for no more than the usual and customary
broker's commission;
2) make inquiries of other brokers who have indicated an interest in
the securities within the preceding 60 days;
3) make inquiries of customers who have indicated an unsolicited
bona fide interest in the securities within the preceding 10 business
days; and
4) publish bid and ask quotations in an inter-dealer quotation
system subject to certain limitations.46
Though the Commission's guidance in this area is scant, it appears
sufficient for the purposes of this article. The registered brokers that
concern this article are those who act as agents on behalf of U.S. persons
wishing to invest in foreign securities. Such brokers, though they may be
thought of as seeking buy orders from U.S. persons, do not have an interest
in purchasing a particular security for their clients. Any security will be just
as good so long as the brokers receive their commissions. Therefore, the
concern is with situations where brokers advertise the fact that they are
available to aid in transactions of a whole list of securities that include
foreign Category 1 securities. Such brokers, so long as they are unaffiliated
with any issuer or distributor, may distribute, as part of their general
advertising, information concerning foreign securities.147 Prohibition of
144 In reference to solicitation, Loss and Seligman write, "Section 4(4) is not a model of clarity."
Loss and Seligman, supra note 107, at S 3-C-8.
145 Id.
146 Rule 144(g). The bid and ask quotations permitted to be published are for "the maintenance
of a bona fide inter-dealer market for the security [in question] for the broker's own account." Rule
144(g)(2)(iii). Presumably, brokers that are not market-makers may not publish bid and ask quotations.
This restriction seems redundant in light of the frequency requirements placed on the publication of
quotations by Rule 144(g)(2)(iii).
147 Registered brokers, of course, must still behave in accordance with the rules and regulations
oftheir respective exchanges. While a detailed treatment ofsuch rules is beyond the scope ofthis article,
it should be noted that the suitability rules in particular may be implicated by the transactions discussed.
Of specific interest to this article, "although the [Commission] has stated that suitability applies to the
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directed marketing efforts is limited to issuers, distributors, and their
affiliates.
1 48
While Rule 144 (g) lays out the issue of broker solicitation for registered
brokers, Rule 902 (c) (3) (v) and Rule 15a-6 address the issue with respect to
foreign brokers. Specifically, Rule 902(c)(3)(v) provides for restrictions on
the publication of broker-dealer quotations that are different from those
listed in Rule 144 (g) (2) (iii). Since, the term foreign broker is not defined in
Regulation S or in its enacting release, registered foreign brokers could
potentially be included in the restrictions of Rule 902(c)(3)(v). If that is the
case, then a registered foreign broker who follows Rule 144(g)(2)(iii) could
still be found in violation of Regulation S for failure to follow Rule
902(c) (3)(v). This is because Rule 902 would presumably take precedence
over Rule 144 in a Regulation S dispute.
Rule 902(c)(3)(v) provides that only the bid and ask quotations of a
foreign broker-dealer may be distributed in the United States. Further-
more, these quotations may be distributed only pursuant to a third-party
system that distributes such quotations primarily in foreign countries.149 An
additional safeguard in Rule 902(c)(3)(v) is the prohibition against
executions, via this quotation system, of transactions between U.S. persons
and the foreign broker-dealer. Finally, the rule restricts contacts between
such foreign broker-dealers and U.S. persons to those allowed by Rule 15a-
6. This effectively makes the relevant solicitation standard for foreign
brokers, registered or unregistered, that of Rule 15a-6.' °
Rule 15a-6(a)(1) has its own definition of solicitation. The essential
difference between the definition here and that governing Section 4(4) is the
advertising of brokers' services. Foreign brokers who are not registered
cannot advertise their services to U.S. investors. The Commission writes
that solicitation, for Rule 15a-6 purposes, would include "any affirmative
effort by a broker or dealer intended to induce transactional business for the
online context[,] ... [i]t has at this point largely accepted the industry position that online trading
operates as a discount brokerage and thus does not trigger application of the [National Association of
Securities Dealers] suitability rules." Shirley Lo, Suitability and Online Trading 22 (Feb. 16, 2001)
(unpublished, on file with author). Presumably, the trading of foreign stocks on-line would be no
different, and unaffiliated registered brokers can, at present, trade in foreign securities for retail
customers without suitability implications.
148 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903 (2002); Commodity and
Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.904 (2002).
149 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902(c)(3)(v) (2002).
ISO Rule 15a-6 is generally applicable only to unregistered foreign brokers. As noted above,
however, Regulation S has made the rule explicitly applicable to all foreign brokers. Without other
language in either the statute or Commission releases, it appears that Rule 15a-6 would also become
applicable to registered foreign brokers.
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broker-dealer or its affiliates."' 5' It continues by stating that "efforts ... to
develop an ongoing securities business relationship" would constitute
solicitation.
152
While the theory of non-solicitation seems clear, the application of Rule
15a-6 is not. Similar to the solicitation rules of Section 4(4), the Commis-
ion has provided little guidance on what activities would be prohibited.
While the enacting release of Rule 15a-6 listed a number of activities that
would constitute solicitation, the Commission asserted that it would
"determine the term's meaning on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
[Commission] precedents."1 3 The Commission did indicate, however, that
a system for distributing bid and ask quotations in a manner similar to that
described in Rule 902(c)(3)(v) may be allowed."M Again, the Commission
reserved the right to determine the validity of each such distribution system
on a case-by-case basis or through future rulemaking. 5 Additionally, as
noted above, acts that are not deemed to be directed market efforts under
Regulation S could be considered solicitation for purposes of Rule 15a-6.'1
56
The Table below summarizes this evaluation.
As can be seen in the Table, the Commission has addressed web sites
that sell securities but has not provided guidelines for Internet marketing or
Internet publication of information by unrelated third parties. There are
presently a number of web sites that provide information on unregistered
offerings.'57 Presumably, as global use of the Internet expands over the next
few years, such sites will become an increasingly significant issue. Specifi-
cally, unrelated third party web publication of information concerning
unregistered offerings may become particularly problematic. As discussed
above, most marketing campaigns run by issuers and distributors will also
be considered offers under the Securities Act's broad definition of offer in
Section 2(a)(3). Information provided by unrelated third parties, though,
will probably not be considered an offer by the issuer or its affiliates.5 8
'SI Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27017
(July 11, 1989).
152 Id.
153 Greene, et al., supra note 50, at § 9.03, 9-16 to 9-17.
154 Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27017
(July 11, 1989).
155 Id.
156 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
157 A search on http://www.google.com brought up several web sites that listed information on
recent and upcoming initial public offerings ("IPOs") in Europe. For more information on these sites,
see the Appendix.
158 But see Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), reprinted in abridged form in Cox et al., supra note
107, at 621.
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Authority Language Allowed Activities
Regulation S No offers into Probably same as those for domestic offers
the United pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act.
States Web sites that sell securities so long as there
are disclaimers against sales into the United





Advertisements required by U.S. or foreign
law provided that the advertisement includes
no more information than that required by
law.
Tombstone advertisements in publications
with less than 20% of their circulation in the
United States.
Visits of investors to facilities in the United
States.
Distribution of a foreign broker-dealer's
quotations as part of a third-party system that
distributes such quotations primarily in for-
eign countries. No method of trading be-
tween U.S. person and foreign broker-dealer.
See Rule 15a-6 for limitations on contacts
between foreign broker-dealers and U.S.
persons.
Notices in accordance with Rules 135 and
135c.
Providing U.S.journalists with access to press
conferences held outside the United States.
Web sites that sell securities so long as there
are disclaimers against selling into the United
States and safeguards, such as getting visitor's
mailing address.
Section 4(4) No solicita- Advertise self as broker.
tion of orders Execute a sell order for no more than the
by brokers usual and customary broker's commission.
Make inquiries of other brokers who have
indicated an interest in the securities within
the preceding sixty days.
Make inquiries of customers who have indi-
cated an unsolicited bona fide interest in the
securities within the preceding ten business
days.
Publish bid and ask quotations.
Rule 15a- No solicita- No advertising of brokers' services.
6(a)(1) tion of Possibly a quotations distribution system
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Thus, U.S. residents may become alerted to information about unregistered
offerings as they surf the web.
E. Goals and Theories of Regulation S
The interpretation of Regulation S and other rules discussed above is in
accord with the underlying goals of Regulation S. The regulation, as
interpreted above, prohibits U.S. residents from purchasing unregistered
foreign securities when there may be sufficient solicitation to entice them to
purchase such securities without full knowledge concerning the foreign
issuers. The interpretation, however, also allows U.S. residents to purchase
such foreign securities freely when it is likely that the investors have the
knowledge and skills to fully understand their investment. Unfortunately,
there appear to be two possible exceptions where the policies behind
Regulations S may be circumvented. The first possible exception arises
when U.S. companies or investors situated in a foreign country invest
pursuant to Regulation S; the second exception arises when U.S. investors
and companies invest through nominee entities.
1. CONSISTENCY WITH THE GOALS OF REGULATION S
Regulation S depends on the categorization of securities in order to
provide what the Commission deems as the appropriate amount of
protection for U.S. capital markets and investors. In enacting Regulation S,
the Commission stated that "registration of securities is intended to protect
the [U.S.] capital markets and investors purchasing in the [U.S.] market,
whether [U.S.] or foreign nationals." 15 9 With this purpose in mind, the
Commission divided U.S. and foreign securities into three categories based
on "the likelihood of flowback [of an issuer's securities] into the United
States and the degree of information available to [U.S.] investors regarding
such securities."' 6° Category 1 securities have the lowest likelihood of
flowback while Category 2 and Category 3 securities have a higher
likelihood of flowback. Category 2 securities, however, have more
information available to U.S. investors than do securities classified as
Category 3.
In enacting Regulation S, the Commission's adopting release devotes a
full paragraph to explaining how each type of security classified within
1s9 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
160 Id. Likelihood of flowback, of course, is directly affected by the amount of advertising and
solicitation allowed in the United States.
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Category 1 has a low likelihood of flowback. 6 1 For instance, securities of
issuers with no substantial U.S. market interest in their securities "are not
likely to flow into the United States." 62 Substantial U.S. market interest is
defined, for purposes of equity securities, by the proportion of an issuer's
total equity securities traded on exchanges or systems inside the United
States.' 6 Thus, if certain securities do not trade in the United States, the
numbers of U.S. residents wishing to purchase them are expected to be
extremely low. Indeed, in enacting rules to facilitate U.S. press access to
foreign press activities, the Commission exempted from the "Written
Materials Requirements" offerings by foreign private issuers and foreign
governments that were wholly offshore "because those offerings would
appear to be of less significant interest to [U.S.] investors." 64 In short, press
requirements could be relaxed for offerings where the likelihood of
flowback was low.6 Moreover, when trading occurs abroad, U.S. markets
would not be directly hurt by fraud or insufficient disclosure; only U.S.
investors trading abroad would be directly injured."6
Where Category 2 securities are concerned, the adopting release of
Regulation S emphasizes the information available to U.S. investors via the
Exchange Act and the institutional structure of the markets of some of these
securities. Thus, Category 2 classification was allowed for non-reporting
foreign debt issuers because "the generally institutional nature of the debt
market and the trading characteristics of debt securities" were deemed
161 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
162 Id. This concept is consistent with the Commission's policy prior to the enactment of
Regulation S. In its proposing release, the Commission explained its position ofallowing investors who
have purchased securities in a private offering as part of a French privatization "to resell the securities
on the Paris Bourse without investigation as to the nationality or residence of the counter-party." This
was because of"limited [U.S.] investor participation on the Bourse and the absence of an active market
for the securities in the United States." Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6779
(June 17, 1988).
163 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.9020)(1) (2002). Substantial U.S.
market interest in debt securities is defined by the number of U.S. holders. Commodity and Securities
Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.9020)(2) (2002).
164 Offshore Press Conferences, Meetings with Company Representatives Conducted Offshore
and Press-Related Materials Released Offshore, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7470,34-39227 (Oct. 17,
1997).
165 There is no indication that these securities constitute a particular sub-class within Category
1. While they do represent securities with which the Commission appears to be particularly comfortable,
there is no indication of the use of this sub-class outside of the "Written Materials Requirements"
exemption.
16 Injury to substantial numbers of U.S. investors, however, could affect U.S. markets as such
investors are likely to hold U.S. securities as well. Once they have lost money abroad, these U.S.
investors may need to liquidate positions in U.S. markets for cash, or they may do so merely out of fear.
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adequate protection for U.S. investors and markets. 67 Furthermore,
reporting foreign issuers with substantial U.S. market interest are classified
as Category 2 issuers on the theory that, if flowback occurs after the
distribution compliance period, "the information relating to such securities
publicly available under the Exchange Act generally should be sufficient to
ensure investor protection. ""6a
With these classifications, the above interpretation of Regulation S is
completely in accord with the underlying policies of Regulation S. Foreign
issuers that meet the substantial U.S. market interest test and that file with
the Commission are classified as Category 2 issuers, and their securities are
subject to a distribution compliance period. United States investors, then,
cannot be harmed until sufficient information is available. For Category 1
issuers, there is little U.S. interest in their securities. So long as there is no
advertisement or solicitation within the United States, few U.S. investors
will even know about, much less wish to purchase, these offerings. There
is no need then to impose a distribution compliance period. Indeed, any
investor who spends the time and energy to find out about such offerings,
despite the lack of advertisement and readily available information, is likely
also to have found sufficient information as to not need the protections of
the Securities Act.' 69 Such investors should be allowed to purchase, and the
securities laws allow them to do so.
The Commission's recent actions also appear to be consistent with this
theoretical explanation. In 1998, when the Commission moved all U.S.
equity securities to Category 3, it refrained from moving foreign equity
securities as well. 7 As part of the move, the Commission extended the
distribution compliance period for U.S. equity securities to one year and
made these securities restricted securities subject to the restrictions of Rule
144.71 The Commission wished to prevent investors from purchasing U.S.
equity securities pursuant to Regulation S "with a view to distributing those
securities into the [U.S.] markets at the end of the [then forty]-day
167 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
168 Id. The same rationale was posited in the proposing release. Offshore Offers and Sales,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-6779 (June 17,1988). As noted above, reporting U.S. issuers were moved
from Category 2 to Category 3 because of the high rate of flowback that resulted from abuses of
Regulation S. Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505,34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
169 Additionally, the SEC believes that investors who reach out and purchase on a foreign
securities market "will rely on the protection of the local securities law." Offshore Offers and Sales,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-6779 (une 17, 1988).
170 See Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505,34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
This move was also discussed in Part II(B)(2) of this article.
171 See id.
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distribution compliance period." 172 By excluding foreign securities from
Category 3, the Commission implies that such securities may be resold into
the United States immediately at the end of the distribution compliance
period. For Category 2 securities, the distribution compliance period is forty
days, and there is no distribution compliance period for Category 1
securities. In its release, the Commission seemingly acknowledged the fact
that Regulation S did not prohibit the sale of foreign securities into the
United States under such conditions. The Commission deliberately
"reminded [purchasers of foreign securities] that Regulation S does not
provide a safe harbor for resales of securities into the United States, and
[that] any resales must be made pursuant to a registration statement or an
exemption from the Securities Act."17 3 The Commission seems to allow
resales of foreign securities into the United States and appears to be aware
of resales into the United States. Given the Commission's tone and the
prohibition on solicitation, such resales must be sufficiently rare as to not
jeopardize substantial numbers of U.S. investors or U.S. markets.'74
Furthermore, in not extending the scope of Rule 905 to foreign
securities, the Commission recognized "that it [is] impossible to keep track
of the restricted status of securities trading in offshore securities markets." 7 5
In this way, the Commission appears to be implicitly acquiescing to the
realities of foreign markets and allowing some such securities to flow into
the United States. Again, the number of such securities flowing into the
United States must be sufficiently small so as not tojeopardize U.S. markets
or significant numbers of U.S. investors. The Commission has stated that
it "will revisit the issue if abuses occur."
176
172 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
Under the Rule 144 restrictions, U.S. equity securities mayonly be sold into the U.S. followingthe one-
year distribution compliance period in accordance with the safe harbor restrictions of Rule 144. Greene,
et al., supra note 50, at §§ 5.02-5.03, 5-25. For non-affiliates, such restrictions do not expire until two
years after the purchase of the securities from an issuer or a distributor. Rule 144(k).
173 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7505, 34-39668 (Feb. 25, 1998).
174 The Commission stated that it "remains concerned with the potential for abuse" in the area
of foreign securities. Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. There is a distinction between issuers deliberately using Regulation S as a vehicle for
making unregistered offerings into the United States and the unintended flow of large numbers of
unregistered foreign securities into the United States. Presumably, the Commission would revisit the
categorization of foreign equity securities in either of these cases.
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2. EXCEPTION 1: RESIDENCY STANDARD
There is an ostensible exception to how well the rules align with the
theories underlying Regulation S. Certain U.S. citizens and entities are
allowed to purchase securities without regard to the issues of possible
flowback and available information. United States nationals living abroad
may invest freely in offshore offerings.'" Similarly, "an authorized
employee [who] places the buy order while abroad" meets "the requirement
that the buyer be outside the United States."7 8 Therefore, such individuals
and entities that may have close ties to the United States and to U.S. markets
are left unprotected by the securities laws.'79
Closer inspection of this situation, however, reveals that the policy
concerns of flowback and available information are still met. In situations
where U.S. citizens living abroad or U.S. companies operating abroad
purchase foreign securities, the possibility of harm to U.S. markets and the
vast majority of U.S. residents is extremely small. Securities purchased by
U.S. citizens or U.S. companies abroad are unlikely to make their way to
U.S. markets. There are two ways in which such securities can reach the
United States: by resale, or by a physical relocation of the investor. These
investors, however, cannot resell their securities into the United States
without meeting the requirements of Rule 904 like any other foreign
investor.1' ° Relocation is a big task and is infrequent for individuals and
certainly unlikely for companies that are organized specifically for the task
of doing business in a foreign country. Just as with Category 1 issuers, the
concerns of flowback are so small as to outweigh any concerns about lack of
information.'8 ' Additionally, while U.S. companies may send employees
17 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
This was also discussed briefly in Part II(B)(1).
178 Id. Only "subsidiaries and affiliate [s]" of U.S. companies that "have separate legal identities"
are allowed to purchase securities in Categories 2 and 3 during the distribution compliance period
because such purchasers are not considered U.S. persons if they are incorporated abroad. Id. This
distinction between the residency requirement of "offshore transactions" and the definition of "US.
person" was discussed in section Part II(B)(1) of this article.
179 Of course, this exception would exist regardless of whether or not brokers for U.S. persons
purchasing offerings are eligible for the § 4(4) exemption.
180 Of course, as stated above, the Commission may have difficulty keeping track of resales.
United States citizens may be more likely to resell their securities into the United States by virtue of their
close ties with the country. In this case, U.S. citizens who purchase abroad may pose a greater threat to
the policies behind Regulation S than others who purchase abroad.
181 There may or may not be a lack of information. This depends on the local country's securities
laws and the investors' familiarity with the customs of the local country. These investors, however, will
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abroad to purchase securities and then transfer them back to the United
States, such situations seem rare outside of the financial industry. Further-
more, financial corporations that have employees abroad who are authorized
to transact on behalf of the corporation are likely to be able to protect
themselves through research.
3. EXCEPTION 2: NOMINEE ENTITIES
182
The second possible exception to the smooth implementation of
Regulation S's policies may be more formidable and is certainly more
confusing. United States investors sometimes trade through offshore
nominee companies. This is shown in Figure 2, below, as an additional
route beyond those depicted in Figure 1. The nominee entity will be foreign
and will not be treated as an U.S. entity. As shown, U.S. investors may trade
foreign securities through accounts with these entities. Often foreign issuers
and brokers will not know who owns the account but only that they are
trading with a nominee company.
Regulation S, though it does not explicitly address nominee entities,
seems to impose a look through requirement on sellers. Recent Commis-
sion announcements on the subject, however, seem to indicate more
tolerance. Any look through requirement for Regulation S must be
considered in light of these recent pronouncements, as they explicitly discuss
nominee entities.
a. Analysis of Regulation S and Nominee Entities
Regulation S itself does not directly address nominee companies. Rule
902(k)(vi) states that "[a]ny non-discretionary account or similar account
... held by a dealer or other fiduciary for the benefit or account of a [U.S.]
person" is considered a U.S. person. The enacting release does not discuss
nominee companies specifically but states that the statute "treats the person
with the investment discretion as the buyer."'' 3 Furthermore, the enacting
release states that, for purposes of an offshore transaction, "the buyer itself,
rather than its agent, [must] be outside the United States."' a4 Nominee
accounts can likely be captured under these provisions. In that case, trading
be less likely to believe that U.S. securities laws can protect them, and this lack of dependence makes
their exemption from Regulation S less damaging.
182 Part IV(E) presents an example where significant numbers of transactions were conducted
through the use of nominee entities.
1R3 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
184 Id.
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with U.S. residents through nominee accounts would be deemed a breach
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While the language of the enacting release quoted above seems to
indicate that Regulation S imposes a look through requirement, the language
of Rule 902. itself may be more generous. Rule 902(h) defines offshore
transactions. It allows the transaction to occur so long as "the seller and any
person acting on its behalf reasonably believe that the buyer is outside the
United States. " " Perhaps, sellers may reasonably believe that a beneficial
buyer is located where the nominee entity is located. This would eliminate
the look through requirement for Category I securities. Category 2 and 3
securities are subject to trading restrictions during their respective distribu-
tion .compliance periods.'6 For primary offerings, these restrictions
185 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902(h)(ii)(A) (2002).
186 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903 (2002); Commodity and
Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.904 (2002).
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specifically state that sales are not to be made to U.S. persons, and no
provision is made for reasonable belief.'" The language in the Regulation
S rules, then, does not seem to apply a look through provision for Category
1 securities but may apply one for Category 2 and Category 3 securities)
88
Forcing issuers of Category 1 securities to lookthrough nominee entities
seems anomalous from a policy perspective. Under Regulation S, issuers of
Category 1 securities are allowed to sell on an established foreign securities
exchange or a designated offshore securities market without knowledge of
who the buyer on the other side may be. Therefore, to ask issuers and
sellers of Category 1 securities to pursue the identity of a beneficial buyer
through a nominee company does not appear justifiable. So long as the
barrier against solicitation remains in place, there is no need for a look
through requirement.
A look through requirement for issuers and distributors would only be
justifiable if the Commission wished to prevent U.S. residents from
participating in primary offerings that are not made on an established foreign
securities exchange. The emphasis is on primary offering because U.S.
residents may partake in secondary market transactions of the same securities
through a designated foreign securities market. Preventing U.S. residents
from participating in such primary offerings makes sense only if purchases
on secondary markets are deemed much less risky than purchases on
primary markets. Preventing U.S. investors from purchasing on the pri-
mary market, however, is an odd result because, usually, the prices on the
secondary market are much higher. There are gains to be made by
purchasing on the primary market. This is because prices on the primary
market often have not been set by "deep liquid markets where rational [or
irrational] expectations .. .have been incorporated."' 89 Under such
circumstances, underwriters often underprice a distribution for reasons that
197 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b) (2002). This is because the
reasonable belief provision comes from the definition of offshore transaction, which is not implicated
in the Rule 903(b) prohibition on sales to U.S. persons during the distribution compliance period.
Commodityand Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.902(h)(ii)(A) (2002); Commodityand Securities
Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b) (2002). Alternatively, for resales, while the definition of offshore
transaction is again not implicated, the restriction on trading Category 2 and 3 securities involves
knowledge; sellers may not have knowledge as to the residence of the U.S. person if they only see the
nominee entity. Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.904(b) (2002). Therefore,
resales through nominee entities may be allowed even for Category 2 and 3 securities. Category 3
securities, however, are specifically brought under the auspices of Rule 144, so such a readingwould not
make sense. Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.905 (2002).
188 At the very least, the look through provision for Category 1 may not be as demanding as the
one implied by the language in the enacting release because sellers can claim reasonable belief.
189 Scott, supra note 8, at 71.
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are beyond the scope of this article. Regardless of the reasons for underpric-
ing, there is no reason to punish U.S. residents investing abroad by
preventing them from partaking in these gains.
Issuers of Category 2 and 3 securities, of course, must prevent the
securities from being transferred to U.S. persons within the distribution
compliance period, so forcingthem to look through nominee entities during
the distribution compliance period seems reasonable and necessary.
Furthermore, such a requirement would be in accord with the lack of a
reasonable belief exemption in the distribution compliance period require-
ments of Rule 903, as discussed above. This would result in two different
look-through standards based on categorization, which does not seem
unreasonable given the other category-based differences in requirements.
b. The Commission's Recent Announcements on Nominee Entities
The Commission's recent pronouncements on nominee entities in the
context of foreign private issuers should be considered. Recently, the
Commission revised the definition of "foreign private issuer" in Rules 405
and 3b-4."9 The reason was that "the increased prevalence of offshore
nominees and custodial accounts has made record ownership less meaning-
ful for purposes of determining [U.S.] ownership." 19' Therefore, the new
definitions require issuers to look through nominees in order to determine
the beneficial owners of their stock.' 92 The Commission felt that this would
make counts of U.S. shareholders more accurate for purposes of determin-
ing whether or not a company "is entitled to the accommodations available
to foreign private issuers." 93
Having required issuers to look through nominees, however, the
Commission softened its stance. Concerns were raised that this require-
ment "would create substantial burden for companies that trade in many
different markets" and would cause "widely held companies... to devote
significant effort and expense in determining beneficial ownership in many
jurisdictions where the likelihood offinding [U.S.] owners is small."' 94 The
190 International Disclosure Standards, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7745,34-41936 (Sept. 28,
1999). Incidentally, the Commission, in promulgating the new merger rules, followed the new
definition of foreign private issuer. See Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business
Combinations and Rights Offerings, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7759,34-42054 (Oct. 22,1999). See
also Rule 800(h)(3).






Commission, therefore, limited the look through requirement to nominees
based in the United States, in the issuer's home jurisdiction, and in the
primary trading market for the issuer's securities. 95 Furthermore, if the
issuer, "after reasonable inquiry," cannot determine the residency of such
holders, the issuer may assume that the holders "are residents of the
jurisdiction in which the nominee has its principal place ofbusiness."' 96 The
Commission, notably, retained the requirement of look-ing through all
nominees regardless of location for purposes of Rule 12g3-2(a).197 It also
did not provide any exception based on reasonable inquiry for Rule 12g3-
2(a).198 Rule 12g3-2(a) exempts issuers with less than 300 U.S. shareholders
from the registration requirement of Section 12(g). The Commission
provided no explanation as to why the look through requirement was not
softened for Rule 12g3-2(a). 99
There are, thus, two different look through requirements. For purposes
of determining foreign private issuer status, issuers only have to look
through nominees in certain geographic locations. For Rule 12g3-2(a)
purposes, issuers must look through all nominees regardless of location.
Given these two differing standards, there is no certainty as to the extent to
which issuers might be required to look through nominees for purposes of
Regulation S. The purposes behind the two rules appear to be similar; both
the foreign private issuer rules and the Rule 12g3-2(a) requirement stem
from the purpose of disclosing information. Rule 12g3-2(a) exempts
companies with fewer than 300 U.S. shareholders from providing informa-
195 Id. For purposes of the merger rules, companies must look through nominees "located in the
United States, the subject company'sjurisdiction of incorporation or that ofeach participant in a business
combination, and the jurisdiction that is the primary trading market for the subject securities." Rule
800(h)(3).
196 Rule 3b-4 and Rule 405. The same exception applies to the merger rules. Rule 800(h)(4).
197 See Rule 12g3-2(a). There is no instruction concerning limiting the requirement as there is
following Rules 3b-4 and 405. Furthermore, there was no indication in the enacting release concerning
limiting the look through requirement of Rule 12g3-2(a). See International Disclosure Standards,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7745, 34-41936 (Sept. 28, 1999).
19s See id.
19 One possible explanation for retainingthe strict look through requirement for Rule 12g3-2(a)
is that the penalties for not meeting the conditions of this rule are not particularly harsh. Foreign private
issuers who do not meet the Rule 12g3-2(a) test may still exempt themselves from S 12(g) registration
requirements by furnishing the Commission with copies of the documents that they have already filed
for purposes of their home country regulations, that they have filed with a stock exchange, or that they
have provided to their security holders. Rule 12g3-2(b); see also Joel Seligman, The Mandatory Disclosure
System and Foreign Firms, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 807, 824 (1995). Therefore, if one meets the foreign
private issuer definition, with the softened look through requirement, and then one fails the Rule 12 g3-
2(a) test or merely chooses not to take on the challenge of doing a strict look through, the default
position of complying with Rule 12g3-2(b) is not particularly costly.
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tion to the public as required by section 12(g).200 Foreign private issuers are
often exempt from U.S. securities laws aimed at providing information to
the public. 20 1 With such similarities underlying the two rules, determina-
tion of which rule should be applied to any look through requirement of
Regulation S is uncertain at best. 2
From a policy perspective, there does not appear to be a need for
Category 1 securities issuers to look through nominees. As mentioned
above, U.S. investors can reach out and purchase directly on an established
foreign securities exchange where issuers are not required to determine the
identity of the party buying the securities. Of course, so long as there is no
advertisement or solicitation, U.S. residents are unlikely to approach such
foreign exchanges, and those who do know about these Category 1 securities
have likely done sufficient research to protect themselves. They certainly
would not expect to be protected by U.S. securities laws. Similarly, those
who invest through a nominee company still have to find out about
Category 1 securities despite the prohibition against directed selling efforts
into the United States. Those who do find out and those who are suffi-
ciently sophisticated to use nominee companies abroad are likely to have
sufficient knowledge concerning foreign securities to protect themselves.
Furthermore, those who reach out into foreignjurisdictions through foreign
nominees are unlikely to expect the protections of the U.S. securities laws.
Therefore, given the theoretical underpinnings of Regulation S, there does
not appear to be any need for issuers to lookthrough nominees when issuing
Category 1 securities. 3
2 Rule 12g3-2(a) and S 12(g) of the Exchange Act.
201 One example would be Rule 801 and 802, where foreign private issuers engaging in a merger
are exempt from the registration requirements of§ 5 of the Securities Act. Another example, of course,
would be Rule 12g3-2(b), referred to in note 199, where foreign private issuers can be exempted from
the S 12 (g) Exchange Act registration requirements by furnishing the Commission with documents that
have already been produced for other purposes.
202 Part IV(E) presents a situation that supports the adoption of the Rule 12g3-2(a) approach.
2 The policy analysis for resales under Rule 904 would be exactly the same with two additions.
Both additions support the idea of no look through requirements. First, for resales, the distribution is
likely to have been concluded, so the threat of a flood of unregistered securities into U.S. hands is
smaller than that faced during the distribution. Second, those reselling securities, including dealers, may
have less capacity for investigating the purchasers than distributors and issuers have. This is because
distributors and issuers are likely to be handling larger quantities ofsecurities, so they can better bear the
costs of investigation.
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IV. PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES ON THE GROUND
Part III of this article presented an analysis of the issues and problems
surrounding the purchase of foreign Category 1 securities by U.S. retail
investors. This part of the article seeks to examine the difficulties and
restrictions surrounding the issue from the perspective of professionals
involved in this field. In particular, this part investigates how professionals
respond to the restrictions discussed in Part III when dealingwith U.S. retail
investors seeking foreign securities. While the analysis above focused on
Category 1 securities, the discussion here includes some discussion of
Category 2 securities because, as a practical matter, the two categories appear
to meld together in practice.
A. Interviews
Information for this part of the article was gathered primarily through
telephone interviews.205 These interviews present a glimpse of current
market practices and cannot be taken as being wholly representative of the
industry. The interviews do, however, provide concrete examples of actions
taken by market professionals that can be contrasted with the analysis
developed in Part III.
The interviews include a number of different perspectives on the issues
presented in Part III. The interviewees for this article were representatives
in the legal departments of two large U.S. financial companies, the outside
legal counsel for a securities exchange, and an executive at a recent issuer.
To maintain the interviewees' anonymity, no names will be used.
Some information on the parties discussed in this article is in order.
The two financial companies examined both provide a broad range of
financial services, including portfolio management and retail brokerage
services. 206 The securities exchange discussed in this part is an electronic
exchange based in Europe.20 7 The issuer investigated in this article made its
X4 By contrast, all individuals interviewed treated and discussed domestic equity securities,
included in Category 3, as completely separate and distinct from other securities traded abroad.
205 The interviews were conducted with the aid of Professor HowellJackson. Professor Howell
E.Jackson is the Finn M. W. Caspersen and Household International Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School. His support was invaluable in the writing of this article.
20 For citation purposes, the financial companies will be referred to as F1 and F2. Their
representatives who were interviewed will be referred to as Fl-1, F2-1, and F2-2 respectively. Two
individuals were interviewed at F2.
2 For citation purposes, the interviewee who provided information about this exchange will be
referred to simply as "legal counsel for the exchange."
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offering as part of a merger transaction from which U.S. resident sharehold-
ers were specifically excluded.
B. Market Practices
Some general information about the retail market for foreign securities
emerged from the interviews. This information provides helpful back-
ground for the analysis presented below.
United States retail interest in foreign securities is apparently extremely
small. One of the financial institutions examined conducts over 100,000
208trades each day for its retail customers. Of this number, only about fifty
concern foreign securities.2 Despite the relatively small volume, the
company is fully equipped to handle foreign trades and regularly does so for
customers who request such transactions.210 Indeed, this is an area of
business that the company is trying to grow.
211
The interviews indicate that foreign exchanges are aware of Regulation
S restrictions and provide some tracking of restricted securities in order to
comply with Regulation S. The exchange discussed in this article designates
its restricted securities with a marker attached to the securities' trading
symbols.2 2 Thus, all member firms trading in a marked stock know that the
stock is restricted for Regulation S purposes and should not be sold to or
purchased for U.S. persons.
The interviews also indicated that there are alternatives to the traditional
trading formats presented in Figure 2. Apparently, one of the financial
companies represented in the interviews sometimes makes markets in
foreign securities."' This market-making activity is apparently carried out
in a form similar to pink sheet transactions that do not trigger Exchange Act
reporting requirements for issuers. 214 Such markets are subject to regulatory
requirements the details of which are beyond the scope of this article.
Commercial information services, however, are apparently sensitive to these
regulatory concerns and publicize the information required by such
208 Interview with F2-1.
-209 Id.
210 Id.
211 E-mail from F2-2. During the phone interview with F2-1, however, he stated that F2 does
not market trades in foreign securities to its retail clients but only provides such services when requested.
Interview with F2-1.
212 Interview with legal counsel for the exchange.
213 Interview with Fl-1.
214 Id.
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regulations. 25 Therefore, an alternative to purchases on a foreign market
appears to be purchases through domestic market makers.
C. A Vietv From the Financial Institutions
From the perspective of those working in the financial institutions, there
appear to be few if any regulatory prohibitions on retail investment in
foreign securities. None of the individuals interviewed at financial
institutions appeared to think of Regulation S as a major issue, and all of
these individuals were lawyers in their respective legal departments.
Of the two financial companies discussed in this article, the one that
does not make markets in foreign securities relies entirely on other brokers
to execute its foreign transactions.2 6 When an individual investor contacts
the institution to buy a foreign security, the institution contacts another
broker-dealer to execute the transaction.217 The customer will deal strictly
with the first institution, but the transaction will be executed by another
broker-dealer, perhaps one with an inventory of foreign stocks.18 This first
institution does not itself carry foreign stocks and serves merely as a conduit.
For this reason, perhaps, its representatives in this area need not concern
themselves with Regulation S as other brokers were handling the execution
of the transactions. Furthermore, since the institution is registered with the
Commission, the restrictions of Rule 15a-6 are not a concern, and advertis-
ing would not be problematic.219
Interestingly, the company that makes markets in foreign securities also
was not particularly concerned about Regulation S. The company's internal
system keeps track of any public distributions with which it is involved. 2
0
Therefore, any employee about to enter a transaction will know whether the
security to be transacted has been recently issued with the company's
assistance." There was uncertainty on the part of this company's represen-
tative as to whether or not her company also tracked other distributions that
were publicized.tm In general, if the market-making company knew about
215 Id.
216 Interview with F2-1.
217 Id.
218 E-mail from F2-2.
219 Part IIl(D) of this article discusses the restrictions of Rule 15a-6.
22 Interview with FI-1.
221 See id.
Zz2 Id. Therefore, it is entirely possible that the company tracks only its own distributions and
not those made by other companies. This may be because, for Category 2 securities, the issuer and its
distributors cannot sell to a U.S. person within the distribution compliance period of forty days.
Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903(b)(2)(ii) (2002). If this company were
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a recent distribution, then the matter would be investigated further.22 3 The
interviewee, however, was not aware of any specific internal rule as to when
such transactions would be executed and when they would not. 4 Since this
company does not have a blanket prohibition on retail transactions,
presumably Category 1 transactions would be allowed. There would be no
reason at all to allow a Category 2 or Category 3 transaction and disallow a
Category 1 transaction.
Neither of the two financial institutions discussed any problems relating
to Section 4(3).22' Presumably, all transactions involving these institutions
would be broker's transactions within the Section 4(4) exemption. 226 One
of the companies explicitly does not market their foreign trading capabilities,
so there should be no problem fitting under the Rule 144 (g) allowances. 7
The other institution's marketing strategies concerning foreign securities
were not discussed, but so long as no specific securities are marketed, there
should not be a problem fitting under Section 4(4)'s allowance of general
advertising of brokerage services.
These results are generally consistent with the analysis of Part III. Part
III concluded that unsolicited interest in foreign securities is not subject to
any regulatory restrictions. In the present case, neither of the financial
institutions investigated appear to be particularly concerned in a regulatory
sense with retail investors who inquire about foreign securities. While one
institution tracks certain distributions in which it has participated, it is not
clear that all recent distributions are tracked. There appears to be no barrier
in practice preventing an investor located in the United States from
purchasing foreign Category I securities through a registered U.S. broker.
involved in a distribution, it may be considered a distributor and would not be allowed to sell to a U.S.
investor. For Category 2 resales, dealers are also prohibited from knowingly selling to a U.S. person.
Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.904(b)(1)(i) (2002). Under the broad definition
of dealer incorporated by the Securities Act, the company, acting in its capacity as a broker, may be
deemed a dealer, but it would probably be considered the buyer in the transaction since it would be
representing a retail purchaser. In another interview, a lawyer raised the possibility that a distributor may
become a market maker or dealer upon completion of the distribution. Interview with legal counsel for
the exchange. In such a situation, sales by the dealer may be restricted, but the lawyer thought that there
should be some accommodation made so that such a dealer would fall under Rule 904 and not Rule 903.
Interview with legal counsel for the exchange.
23 Interview with F 1-1.
224 Id.
225 See interviews with F1-1 and F2-1.
226 Part Ill(B) of this article discusses the effects of S 4(3) and 4(4) on Category 1 offerings.
M Interview with F2-1.
INVESTING ABROAD
D. Analysis of an Electronic Exchange
The electronic exchange examined in this article does not appear to
impose any special restrictions on Category 1 trading. Therefore, U.S.
investors should be able to purchase such securities by contacting a
European dealer that is a member of the exchangeY 8 The exchange appears
only to impose restrictions on the trading of Category 3 securities for
Regulation S compliance purposes.
The exchange has been designated as an offshore securities market and
bases its primary distribution practices on published Commission no-action
letters. The exchange is designated as an offshore securities market pursuant
to Rule 902(b) so that resales made pursuant to Rule 904 on the exchange
would be considered offshore under Rule 902(h)(1)(ii)(B)(2)*229 With
respect to primary offerings made pursuant to Rule 903, the situation is a bit
more complicated because of the Category 3 requirements applied to U.S.
equity securities. 30 In particular, Rule 903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(1) requires that
purchasers certify that they are not U.S. persons. According to legal counsel
for the exchange, the identity of a purchaser on an electronic exchange is
impossible to determine. For this aspect of its practices, the exchange relies
on the protocol established by published Commission letters. In such
situations where purchasers cannot be identified, an important condition
imposed by the Commission is the requirement that all restricted securities
under Rule 905 be designated with an additional marker attached to their
trading symbols. 23' Furthermore, the significance of this marker must be
publicized, and all member firms are expected to act appropriately when
trading one of these marked stocks. 2  The exchange has followed such
procedures in its Practices.
233
As a result of these procedures and of being designated an offshore
securities market, trades falling within the Regulation S safe-harbor may
occur on the exchange. United States retail investors, so long as they contact
a member firm, can trade on this exchange. With the exception of the
marked Category 3 securities, brokers are not restricted from making
2n All member firms of this particular exchange must be European.
229 To preserve anonymity, the no-action letter so designating the exchange is not cited.
M Interview with legal counsel for the exchange.
231 European Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation N.V/S.., SEC No-Action
Letter, available at 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 652 Uuly 27, 1999). Incidentally, this letter, relied upon by
the exchange, applies only to non-reporting U.S. companies. See id.
2 Id.
233 Interview with legal counsel for the exchange.
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purchases on behalfof U.S. investors on the exchange, and similarly issuers,
distributors, and others may sell through the exchange in offshore transac-
tions. Interestingly, Category 2 securities, unlike their Category 3 counter-
parts, are not tracked by any designation attached to their trading symbols.234
The Commission appears not to require such tracking.235 Thus, there is no
way to identify a Category 2 issuer during its distribution compliance period.
There appear to be no limits, then, to U.S. retail purchases of Category 2
securities. This would, of course, imply that there are also no limits to U.S.
retail purchases of Category 1 securities.
The result with respect to Category 1 securities confirms the analysis of
Part III. In Part III, the article concluded that Regulation S did not impose
any restrictions on U.S. retail investors purchasing Category 1 foreign
securities so long as the securities were purchased offshore. 36 In this
situation, the exchange examined is a designated offshore securities market;
while Regulation S does not define established foreign securities exchange,
a no-action letter relied upon by the exchange indicates that it likely qualifies
for such status.237 Accordingly, U.S. investors may freely trade in Category
1 securities.
The result of this regime with respect to Category 2 securities is more
problematic. While Category 2 securities were not discussed in detail in Part
III, the regime discussed here presents an interesting opportunity for
analysis. According to Rule 903(b)(2)(ii), no offer or sale may be made by
an issuer or distributor to U.S. persons within a forty-day distribution
compliance period. As noted previously, however, one cannot identify the
purchaser of a security on an electronic exchange. Therefore, it is unclear
as to how distributors selling securities on the exchange in question can
avoid selling to U.S. persons. Without a marker to prevent other member
firms from buying on behalf of U.S. individuals, there appear to be no
restrictions on purchases by U.S. persons.
The solution to this dilemma appears to lie in the common practice of
issuers on this particularly exchange. Apparently, issuers sell their securities
to institutional investors who often, though not always, immediately sell the
securities on the exchange. 3  Legal counsel for the exchange seemed to
imply that the securities were sold at a price very close to the primary
market-offering price. In Europe, these institutional investors are not
234 Id.
233 See European Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation N.V./S.A., SEC No-
Action Letter, available at 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 652 Uuly 27, 1999).
236 See Part Ill(A) of this article.
237 See id.
23 Interview with legal counsel for the exchange.
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considered distributors, as they would be if the underwriter definition in
Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act were invoked. 9 Therefore, their
actions fall under the resale provision of Rule 904. Because Rule
904(b)(1)(i) implements a knowledge requirement, unwitting sales to U.S.
persons due to the anonymity of the exchange is not prohibited by
Regulation S
240
That the Commission has addressed anonymity problems with respect
to electronic exchanges in a published no-action letter is of importance.
2 41
239 Id. This raises an interesting choice-of-law question, a full exploration of which is beyond
the scope of this article. Intuitively, however, since Regulation S is a U.S. law promulgated under the
Securities Act, the definition of underwriter found in S 2(a)(1 1) of the Securities Act should apply. That
would make these institutional investors distributors by virtue of Rule 902(d), which states that
"'Distributor' means any underwriter, dealer, or other person who participates ... in the distribu-
tion ... ." Strict adherence to this reading, however, leads to the statutory mess that follows.
Accordingto Rule 902(0, the distribution compliance period begins "when the securities [are]
first offered to persons other than distributors... or the date of closing of the offering, whichever is
later." In most cases, this would appear to indicate that the distribution compliance period would not
begin until after the closing of the offering. Mr. Greene's treatise on foreign securities transactions,
however, seems to indicate that, "except in delayed offerings," the later date would be the date the
securities are first offered to the public, so the distribution compliance period "is no longer tied to the
completion of the distribution of securities." Greene, et al., supra note 50, at SS 5.02-03, 5-17. This may
be because the distribution, as noted in the text, is deemed to be complete after the securities are
transferred to the institutional investors. Under the U.S. interpretation of underwriter, however, the
distribution is not complete until after the institutional investors have completed their sales to the public.
Since these investors are usually not bound to sell to the public, completion of the distribution may be
difficult to define. Even so, under U.S. rules, the distribution compliance period should not start until
the institutional investors have completed their sales.
Upon completion ofthe distribution, a new dilemma arises. The standard U.S. interpretation
of distribution includes any sales by distributors or issuers. Therefore, sales during the distribution
compliance period by issuers or distributors would constitute a new offering or distribution. Perhaps,
then, no distributors can ever make sales as distributors within the distribution compliance period
because such sales would become their own Regulation S distribution. If this is so, then one need not
worry about excluding U.S. investors from sales made during the distribution compliance period as
mandated by Rule 903(b)(2)(ii). No such sales would exist. Of course, this interpretation also makes
Rule 903(b)(2)(ii) unnecessary. That does not seem plausible.
To give Rule 903(b)(2)(ii) meaning, two possible interpretations ofthis dilemma are offered.
The first is that distributors and issuers can make sales after the end of the distribution without those
sales becoming a new distribution. The second explanation is that the distribution compliance period
begins with the public distribution of the securities to the institutional investors. In either scenario, U.S.
interpretations of law are not followed.
240 Rule 904(b)(1)(i) states that resales bya dealer within the distribution compliance period must
not be made to any person that the dealer "knows" to be a U.S. person. Clearly, dealers cannot identify
those making purchases on the exchange and cannot knowingly sell to a U.S. person. Resales by non-
dealers do not appear to be limited at all by the distribution compliance period and, barring other
applicable exemptions to the Securities Act, are limited only to offshore transactions without directed
selling efforts. Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.904(a) (2002).
241 See European Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation N.VIS.A., SEC No-
376 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:329
The Commission's actions would indicate that there is no concern here with
respect to Category 2 securities. This could be because sales of Category 2
securities to U.S. persons are not violations of Regulation S or because the
likelihood of flowback is extremely low. 242  The former explanation is
unlikely given the explicit language of Rule 903(b)(2)(ii). The latter is more
plausible, but there are no Commission pronouncements to support this
view.
With respect to the other restrictions on U.S. investment in Category 1
securities discussed in Part III, legal counsel for the exchange appeared to
have no concerns. Specifically, when asked about the potential Section 4(3)
forty-day limitation, legal counsel stated that he had never considered it.
243
As an initial reaction, however, he thought that imposing a Section 4(3)
limitation on such transactions would be inappropriate if not wrong. He
believed that the purpose of Regulation S was to give clarity to the scope of
U.S. jurisdiction over overseas offerings; therefore, hunting for more
restrictions beyond Regulation S would be counter to the regulation's
explicit goals. Furthermore, with respect to Rule 15a-6 broker-dealer
registration requirements, legal counsel for the exchange seemed to believe
that it is not unusual for U.S. investors to open accounts with European
brokers, so compliance with U.S. rules must not be particularly
problematic.244
These conclusions are consistent with the analysis of Part III provided
that all restrictions on solicitation by brokers are met. The interview with
legal counsel for the exchange, however, did not address solicitation, so the
possibility exists that the restrictions may be less stringent than the analysis
in Part III indicate.
E. Case-Study ofan Issuer
This article uses the experience of a merger transaction to examine the
perspective of an issuer on Regulation S offerings.245 While prior sub-
Action Letter, available at 1999 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 652 (July 27, 1999).
242 Part III(E)(1) of this article discusses the central role that flowback plays in the rationale and
structure of Regulation S.
243 The effects of § 4(3) on Category 1 offerings is discussed in Part Ill(B) of the article.
244 The implications of Rule 15a-6 on foreign offerings is detailed in Part Ill(C).
245 While interviews with the representative of the new company provided the most important
information on the issuer's perspective and decision-making process, much information on the
transaction was gathered from public sources. Financial information on the acquired company was
available through filings with the Commission as were many merger documents. Filings were found via
Global Access, an electronic service. Some information was found via Bloomberg's electronic service
as well. Professor Howell Jackson provided information on American Depositary Shares ("ADSs") of
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sections involved general responses to hypothetical requests and
transactions, this subsection investigates an actual, consummated merger.
Therefore, this subsection necessarily includes more factual details so
readers will have a full understanding of the issuer's concerns.
The company formed in the merger will be called Newco, and it is
incorporated in the United Kingdom and traded on the London Stock
Exchange. It was formed through the merger of two companies, termed P
and T for purposes of this discussion. P was incorporated in the United
Kingdom, and T was incorporated in the Netherlands. T's stock was traded
in Amsterdam and in NewYork as American Depositary Shares ("ADSs").
246
The merger took place in the summer of 1999. Under the terms of the
transaction, a fixed number of P shares were issued for each T share.
247
United States shareholders were not included in the offering, and a cash
offer for outstanding T shares was made in July of 2000.248
1. T SHARES
A brief description of the T shares exchanged as part of this transaction
is in order. For purposes of this article, T shares will be discussed under two
labels. Amsterdam shares refer to T shares that are traded on the
Amsterdam exchange, and NewYork shares refer to ADSs that represent T
shares and that are traded in New York. 249 At the time of the transaction,
most T shares were held as Amsterdam shares.25' Additionally, at the time
of the transaction, T only knew the identity of approximately 75% of the
beneficial holders of its stock. The remaining 25% of shareholders held
their stock through nominee entities. According to Dutch depositary law,
the acquired company that was originally obtained through the New York Stock Exchange. The
executive interviewed originally worked at the acquired company prior to the merger. For citation
purposes, he will be referred to as the "Newco executive."
246 T actually had two classes of stock. The first was wholly owned by a foreign, controlling
company. Forty-eight percent of the second class of stock was also owned by the controlling company,
and the remaining 52% of this second class of stock was owned by the public. This article is only
concerned with U.S. shareholders who owned the second class ofT stock, so references to T stock refer
solely to this second class.
247 Presumably, after the transaction, the P shares were renamed Newco shares.
248 Interview with the Newco executive. No press release concerning this cash offer was found
on Newco's web site, though a press release stating Newco's intent to make a cash offer was posted on
the web site.
249 Each T ADS represented one Amsterdam share.
250 According to the Newco executive interviewed, this was true not only for U.S. holders, as
described below, but also for holders in the United Kingdom and in various European countries,
particularly Germany.
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T could not seek to look through the nominee for the identity of the
beneficial holder.25'
When T's shares were first offered in the United States, nineteen million
shares were registered. The number actually issued, however, is unclear.
According to data from the NewYork Stock Exchange, by the end of 1997,
there were just over 5 million New York shares left. One year later, that
number was down to 1.9 million shares. The Newco executive interviewed
estimated that, at the time of the transaction, there were still approximately
1.5 million NewYork shares. Thus, there was a clear trend of moving away
from holding T stock in the form of New York shares.
Interestingly, the Newco executive believed that the proportion of U.S.
shareholders actually increased over this period. Initially, when the New
York shares were first offered, U.S. shareholders held approximately 35% of
the distributed shares. The interviewee believed that the proportion had
increased to 40% by the time of the transaction. Apparently, many U.S.
investors were purchasing T shares directly in the form of Amsterdam
shares. The interviewee believed these investors to be mostly institutional
but was not sure about the exact composition. As noted above, Dutch
depositary laws prevented T personnel from looking through nominees and
identifying beneficial shareholders.5 2
The NewYork shares remaining at the time of the transaction were held
by a core group of investors that consisted of two to three institutional
investors and a handful of retail investors.253 During the public offering,
some retail investors had participated. 2-4  The Newco executive felt,
however, that U.S. retail interest had been limited after the offering. The
NewYork shares were traded at a rate of approximately one hundred shares
per day. The Amsterdam shares, in contrast, had a trading volume of
approximately 200,000 shares per day. Thus, the center of activity for T
shares was clearly Amsterdam.
By the end of the transaction, approximately 98.5% of outstanding T
shares had been tendered for exchange. This left between 600 and 700
thousand shares outstanding. The Newco executive stated that, since the
beginning of 2000, some of these shares have slowly been redeemed. He did
not specify as to whether or not they have been exchanged for Newco stock
or for cash. By early summer of 2000, only 250,000 shares of T stock
remained outstanding. While some of these are New York shares, some of
them are also Amsterdam shares. The Newco executive attributed these





Amsterdam shares to Dutch holders who, for a variety of reasons, have not
exchanged their shares.2 55 He would not speculate as to whether or not
these Amsterdam shares might have been held by U.S. retail investors.
2. DECISION NOT TO REGISTER P SHARES
The decision not to register the P shares sheds light on the foreign
companies' perceptions of U.S. investors and of Regulation S. This decision
was made early in the process and was based on three reasons. 56
First, both companies feared the possibility of a hostile bidder, so the
merger had to proceed relatively quickly. T seemed to be under the
impression that the shareholder vote would have to await the Commission's
approval of the transaction.257 The Newco executive stated that he felt
registration in the United States would have added an additional three weeks
to the period between the announcement of the merger and the receipt of
shareholder approval.
Second, T believed that most of its U.S. shareholders were institutional
investors with offshore offices.2-8 This would make them non-U.S. persons
for purposes of Regulation S, and they would be allowed to participate in the
transaction. In short, T believed that only a small proportion of its
shareholders would be unable to participate in an unregistered transaction.259
Third, the addition of a registered U.S. tranche would have added to the
cost and complexity of the transaction. While this option was never priced,
the dominant belief at T was that the benefit of a U.S. tranche would be too
small to justify its price, particularly given T's belief that most U.S.
shareholders would be able to participate in the unregistered offering.26°
As shown below, these perceptions appear to be mostly correct.
3. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE OFFERING
U.S. participation in the public offering of P shares was prohibited by
Regulation S. P shares had no U.S. trading market, so they were classified
as Category 1 securities. The restrictions that applied, then, were the
prohibition against directed selling efforts into the United States and the
2S5 The Newco executive's list of reasons included Dutch holders who have remained unaware
of the merger, who have died, and who have simply forgotten about their shares.
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prohibition against making offers or selling shares into the United States.
As a result, T shareholders resident in the United States could not directly
exchange their T shares for P shares regardless of whether they held their T
shares in the form of Amsterdam shares or New York shares.
By the end of the transaction, the number of outstanding T ADSs
totaled between 250,000 and 350,000.261 This is in contrast to the 1.5 million
ADSs held by U.S. shareholders at the beginning of the transaction. The
question, then, is how over 1 million ADSs were exchanged despite the
Regulation S prohibition against selling into the United States. Moreover,
the 40% of shares held by U.S. investors also could not have been exchanged
unless those U.S. investors traded from offshore offices or otherwise resided
abroad. Under the analysis of Regulation S developed above, U.S.
shareholders are only allowed to participate in an offshore primary offering
through an established foreign securities exchange. 262  In the present
situation, the transaction ofT shares for newly issued P shares did not occur
through an exchange.
Most U.S. institutional shareholders, who held shares in the form of
either New York shares or Amsterdam shares, transferred their shares
offshore in order to participate in the offering.263 Those shareholders who
had a branch office in a foreign country could transfer their shares to that
branch. They would no longer be considered as resident in the United
States, and they could exchange their shares as part of the transaction.2 64
For those U.S. institutional investors who did not have a foreign branch,
there was the option of nominee companies.265 According to the Newco
executive, at least one or two U.S. institutional shareholders transferred their
T shares to nominee accounts offshore. From there, if the shares were held
in the form of New York shares, they would be exchanged for Amsterdam
shares. At that point, all Amsterdam shares would be redeemed for P shares.
Furthermore, some institutional investors were gently steered towards
"brokers [who were] not party to the transaction" but who knew how to
transfer U.S. shares offshore.2'6 Additionally, T also received numerous
telephone calls from angry U.S. investors. United States investors that
contacted T directly were told that U.S. law prohibited any contact with
them and that they should seek professional investment advice.267
261 Id.
26 This analysis was developed in Part Ill(A) of this article.
263 Interview with Newco executive.
264 The statutory analysis for this outcome was established in Part Ill(A) of this article.




4. REGULATION S AND ITS POLICIES
This case poses two issues. First, the case seems to push at the technical
limits of what is sanctioned by Regulation S. Second, this case presents an
opportunity to study the effectiveness of Regulation S in promulgating the
policies discussed above.
268
a. Application of Regulation S
The way U.S. investors handled the merger transaction raises several
Regulation S questions. These issues include the use of a branch office, the
use of nominees, and the possible brokers' solicitations.
As described above, some U.S. institutional investors moved their T
shares to offshore offices and participated in the exchange transaction
through these offices. This appears to have been in accord with Regulation
S. Authorized employees are allowed to buy shares for a company abroad,
and the transaction will not be deemed a sale to a buyer in the United
States.269 In the present situation, the offices of U.S. institutional investors
abroad must have had authorized employees to make trades for the
investors, so the transactions are likely to have been permissible under
Regulation S.
The use ofnominee accounts presents a slightly more complicated issue.
Indeed, it presents multiple issues. First, there is the problem of knowledge
that a buyer is in the United States. The executive at T knew of certain U.S.
institutional investors who had shifted their stocks to offshore nominee
accounts. Regardless of whether or not P has a duty to look through the
nominee, one pertinent question is whether T must impart that knowledge
to P. The two companies are, after all, merging. From P's perspective, the
issue is whether P may be charged with knowledge of a U.S. buyer because
T possessed that knowledge. The rules of Regulation S do not present an
answer to this situation. From a policy perspective, it seems that a company,
such as T, that has U.S. shareholders and is participating in an unregistered
offeringwhich directly affects its shareholders should be held responsible for
preventing any breaches of Regulation S. Any solution, at this point
however, would be purely speculative.
268 The policy analysis can be found in Part 1II(E)(1).
269 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
This outcome is discussed in Part Ill(A) of this article.
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The second problem that arises with the use of nominees is that of
whether or not an issuer should be required to look through nominees.
270
In this situation, two sets of investors held shares through nominee entities.
First, institutional investors transferred their holdings to offshore nominee
companies; second, there is a high probability that retail investors who
purchased Amsterdam shares did so through nominee entities.2  There-
fore, this case indicates that the Rule 12g3-2(a) method of looking through
nominees is more appropriate. 272 In the context of this merger transaction,
all shareholders want to participate.27 3  Therefore, if the issuer is only
required to look through certain nominees, as is the case under the foreign
private issuer rules, then shareholders, both institutional and retail, will
specifically choose nominees in countries that are not subject to the look
through requirement. While the issue of whether or not issuers must look
through nominees remains ambiguous, this situation would favor using the
look through requirement of Rule 12g3-2(a) if a requirement is imposed.
The merger transaction also highlights the distinction between
purchasing on the primary market as opposed to the secondary market. U.S.
investors who sell their T shares on the Amsterdam exchange and buy
Newco shares on the London Stock Exchange have effected a substantially
similar outcome but have not participated in the transaction. This is no
different from the mandatory cash out that is imposed on U.S. investors
who do not use nominee accounts. The advantage of the nominee account
is the ability to directly participate in the exchange. The risk of market
fluctuation of the prices of Newco and T shares between trades is
eliminated. Additionally, there may be tax advantages to a direct trade.
The situation concerning brokers who helped U.S. institutional
investors move their T shares to offshore nominee accounts raises a couple
of separate issues. First, there is a serious question as to whether or not
these brokers are independent of the issuer. If P is the sole issuer, then the
brokers are likely to be independent, as there is no hint of contact between
270 Interestingly, one ofthe interviewees was of the opinion that no look through was necessary.
Interview with legal counsel for the exchange. He seemed to think that checking an issuer's books,
which would usually list a single global certificate, would be sufficient. Id. This would result in a single
non-U.S. investor. He did not provide any statutory support for this analysis. See id. A detailed
discussion of look through requirements can be found in Part III(E)(3) of the article.
271 Representatives at both of the financial institutions discussed in this article were ofthe opinion
that any securities they purchased on behalf of U.S. retail investors would be held in nominee names.
Interviews with FI and F2-1.
272 Rule 12g3-2(a) requires issuers to look through all nominees regardless of geography. This
is discussed in Part III(E)(3).
273 Presumably, investors holdingT shares will want to remain invested in the company. If they
did not, they would have sold their shares long ago.
INVESTING ABROAD
the brokers and P. There may have been some contact between T and the
brokers. As noted above, T and P are merging and may be treated as one
company. In that situation, any T contact with a broker may cause the
broker to lose its independence and become effectively a distributor. For
Regulation S purposes, distributor is defined as "any underwriter, dealer, or
other person who participates, pursuant to a contractual arrangement, in the
distribution of the securities offered."274 The contractual arrangement aspect
of this definition appears to implicate a question of fact, so the independence
of the brokers cannot be resolved definitively in this article. If the brokers
are deemed distributors, then moving U.S. shareholders to offshore
nominee accounts may be deemed an offer into the United States in
violation of Rule 903.275 Of course, to the extent these shareholders are
institutional, there is less concern about protecting them.
The second issue raised by the brokers' participation in this deal is that
discussed pursuant to the discussion of Section 4(3) of the Securities Act
above.276 If Section 4(3) is applicable to transactions under Regulation S,
then transactions that occur within forty days of the offering require a
Section 4(4) exemption. This requires that the transaction be unsolicited.
The factual questions would center on whether or not a referral by T to
certain brokers constituted solicitation. The relationship between T and the
brokers would have to be examined.
b. Goals and Effects of Regulation S
This part examines whether or not Regulation S meets its goals in this
context and the effect of Regulation S on the capital markets in the merger
context. The goal of Regulation S, as stated above, is to protect U.S.
investors and markets, and the method by which it does so is to limit
flowback except in cases where there is sufficient information available to
U.S. residents. 277 The distinction that separates Category 1 from the other
categories is the low likelihood of flowback of Category 1 securities.
Analysis of this situation suggests that this goal may not have been met
entirely with satisfaction. This merger also suggests that Regulation S does
little to reduce the efficiency of global capital markets but may disadvantage
U.S. markets and investors.
Z74 Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(d) (2002).
ZT5 It is unlikely that these brokers will be deemed to be distributors ifinstitutional investors who
purchase from issuers and sell immediately on an exchange are not deemed to be distributors. See infra
note 239.
Z76 This was discussed in Part Ill(B).
Z7 This concept is developed in Part III(E)(1) of the article.
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Category 1 securities are supposed to have a low likelihood offlowback,
and few shares are supposed to land in U.S. hands. In this situation,
however, the barrier against advertising into the United States may have
failed, not because of action by Newco, but because some U.S. investors
already owned T stock and were naturally interested in the matter. Indeed,
as shareholders, they-had a right to be informed about the future of their
investment. In this situation, while the newly issued P securities were
rightfully classified as Category 1 securities, there were a number of U.S.
shareholders that participated in the transaction.278 Therefore, the flowback
concern was not adequately met by the conditions of Regulation S.
279
The flowback concern in this situation is mitigated by the fact that many
of the U.S. investors were institutional investors. Presumably, institutional
investors need less protection than individual investors of the general public.
Indeed, should the transaction have included a Rule 144A tranche, some of
the U.S. shareholders of T may have been able to participate through that
mechanism. Therefore, even though the flowback concerns of Regulation
S may not have been met, the overall goal of protecting U.S. investors and
markets may not have been jeopardized.
The idea that information disclosure will mitigate any damage done by
flowback of unregistered securities is inapplicable to this situation. In this
context, T, a reporting company, was merged into a non-reporting company,
P. Therefore, T, after the merger, stopped filing with the Commission.
Newco, however, also does not file with the Commission.280 In this
situation, the mitigating effects of disclosure that support the rules behind
Category 2 securities do not exist.
From a capital markets perspective, Regulation S seems to have done
well in avoiding substantial barriers to capital flow. Most U.S. institutional
investors were able to transfer their holdings offshore and participate in the
transaction. There would be some transactional costs to this transfer, but
there appears to be no reason that such costs would be substantial.
Furthermore, individual retail investors could have sold their T holdings in
Amsterdam and bought Newco or P stock with the proceeds. Again, there
278 P's new securities were rightly classified as Category I securities because P had no trading
market in the United States and therefore had no substantial U.S. market interest. Commodity and
Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902() (2002).
2 This supposes that sales to U.S. shareholders through nominee entities are not in violation
of Regulation S. If that is not the case, then many of the U.S. shareholders would have been prevented
from participating in the transaction, and flowback would have been limited.
2 The only filings Newco has made to the Commission are an annual report, interim financial
results, and a couple ofcirculars to shareholders. Presumably, these were made pursuant to Rule 12g3-
2(b)(1)(i). The fact that Newco filed under Rule 12g3-2(b) indicates that the exemption in Rule 12g3-
2(a) was not met. Thus, there must be more than 300 U.S. shareholders of Newco.
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would be transaction costs. These costs may be slightly more significant
because individual investors may have a more difficult time identifying
brokers that will trade on foreign exchanges. Alternatively, there appears to
be no barrier, except for knowledge, preventing retail investors from
undertaking the transaction through nominee entities. The only barrier
appears to be U.S. investor knowledge concerning the practice of
transferring their New York shares to nominee entities.2 1 Where U.S.
residents have an inherent interest in the offering, Regulation S does not
pose a significant barrier to U.S. participation, except to the extent that U.S.
retail investors do not know about transferring their shares offshore.
From the issuer's perspective, the lack of a U.S. component made little
difference. Most of T's U.S. shareholders were able to participate.
Furthermore, its prior experience had shown that most of its U.S.
shareholders held shares in the form of Amsterdam shares and had bypassed
purchasing New York shares. Thus, there was no need for a U.S.
component. Regulation S allowed for a smooth transaction bypassing the
U.S. markets with little or no loss of access to capital.2 2 In this way,
Regulation S worked smoothly, but the transaction itself calls into question
the effectiveness and competitiveness of the U.S. regime.
V. CONCLUSION
This article examined the restrictions, or lack thereof, placed on U.S.
retail investors wishing to purchase Category 1 foreign securities. The
article, then, through a series ofinterviews, sought to determine the market's
understanding of and response to these regulatory issues. For the most part,
market professionals appear to behave according to the dictates ofU.S. laws,
though sometimes they may not have been aware of the full complications
inherent in these laws. One surprising development was the seemingly
pervasive use of nominee entities in the transactions studied and the cloud
of regulatory ambiguity surrounding such use. Another surprising result
was the seeming lack of differentiation by the market between Category 1
and Category 2 securities.
After thorough examination ofRegulation S, Section 4(3), and Rule 15a-
6, this article concludes that the only potential barriers to U.S. retail
M Presumably, U.S. retail investors holding Amsterdam shares could participate. Afterall, it
appears that U.S. retail investors who invest directly offshore hold their shares under nominee names.
See interviews with Fl-1 and F2-1; see also infra note 271.
M Indeed, the Newco executive stated that T's experience with ADSs discouraged them from
listing again in the United States because registration was costly and those handful of retail investors left
holding New York shares merely created problems.
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investment in foreign Category 1 securities are those rules that concern
advertising and solicitation. In particular, Regulation S imposes prohibitions
against directed marketing efforts into the United States on the part of
issuers, distributors, and other sellers. 3 If the Section 4(3) forty-day
limitation applies to Regulation S distributions, then the non-solicitation
provisions concerning Section 4(4) brokers' transactions, delineated in Rule
144(g), must be met when trading within the forty-day restricted period.
For unregistered brokers, of course, transactions may not be undertaken on
behalf of U.S. residents unless such transactions are unsolicited. These
solicitation rules, when met, allow an U.S. investor to purchase Category 1
securities through an established foreign securities exchange or designated
offshore securities market.
281
The complexity of the brokers' solicitation rules does not appear to have
any significant affect on the behavior of the market. As a matter of practice,
most U.S. investors will contact a registered broker when interested in a
foreign security. These brokers are allowed to advertise their brokerage
services and usually do not advertise specific securities unless they are
market makers.8 5 These registered brokers will contact foreign, probably
unregistered, brokers and affiliates who are market makers in the foreign
security or who are members of the appropriate exchanges to execute the
transactions in question. Thus, as a practical matter, the brokers' non-
solicitation requirements do not seem to pose any particularly difficult
regulatory challenges.
The only serious limitation on U.S. retail investors, then, is the lack of
advertising. U.S. investors who do not know about a security will not desire
to purchase that security. As a protective barrier for U.S. investors and
markets, mere lack of interest seems thin. It does, however, accord with the
Commission's pronouncements pertaining to Regulation S. 286 Further-
more, since Category 1 securities are issued by foreign companies with no
interest in acquiring U.S. investors, this barrier is consistent with the
territorial approach to securities regulation.
One surprising inconsistency developed in this article concerns the use
of nominee entities when purchasing foreign securities. According to all of
M Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (2002); Commodity and
Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.904 (2002).
M Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.903 (2002); Commodity and
Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. S 230.904 (2002).
2s For the most part, registered U.S. brokers would not make markets in foreign securities. One
of the financial institutions examined, however, did perform some market-making duties and conduct
various "pink-sheet" transactions in select foreign securities, as discussed in Part IV(B) above. In such
cases, presumably, the company would have to be careful about to whom it advertised these securities.
2 Offshore Offers and Sales, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6863, 34-27942 (Apr. 24, 1990).
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those market professionals interviewed, U.S. investors holding foreign
securities would most likely hold them through nominee entities.
Regulation S does not address nominee entities explicitly, and recent
Commission pronouncements treating nominee entities do not provide clear
guidelines. All of these Commission statements, however, do indicate that
some lookthrough requirement exists to ensure that issuers selling securities
under Regulation S determine the residency of beneficial buyers.
From a policy perspective, this requirement makes little sense because
Category 1 securities may be sold on an exchange or in a designated market
without regard to the identity of a buyer. Of course, the policy arguments
are different for Category 2 and Category 3 securities because each of those
categories implicates a distribution compliance period. To have two
different rules based on the categorization of a security does not represent
a problem. The ambiguity presented by nominee entities is an issue ripe for
future study, or determination by the Commission, as the market in foreign
securities appears to use nominee entities frequently with disregard for the
identity of beneficial buyers.
Another area that may require further investigation concerns the
distinction between Category 1 and Category 2 securities. This article
focused on Category 1 securities under the assumption that Category 2 and
Category 3 securities are distinct and separate. From a statutory perspective,
that is true. The rules that apply to Category 2 securities are distinctly and
substantively different from those that apply to Category 1 securities. From
the interviews conducted, however, the distinctions seem to be less
pronounced on a practical level. Category 3 securities are always treated
differently as they should be. Category 2 securities, however, were
infrequently mentioned or considered by those interviewed. Perhaps,
because of the small field of interviewees and the focused interview
questions, market practices differentiating between Categories 1 and 2 were
not elucidated. Regardless of the cause, the present indication is that few
distinctions exist, and further study should be conducted on the matter.
The results of this article indicate that U.S. securities laws prevent
investment abroad primarily through the prohibition on advertisement and
solicitation. The market evidence indicates that the volume of U.S. retail
investment abroad is relatively low. While this could be attributed to lack
of U.S. interest, it could also indicate that the lack of solicitation and
marketing has worked. U.S. residents, unaware ofopportunities for foreign
investment, do not invest abroad.2 7 As Internet use becomes increasingly
2 Additionally, foreign opportunities may not look as attractive when compared to U.S.
opportunities that are supported by marketing.
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global, however, restricting advertisement, and information flows in general,
will become increasingly difficult. From the Commission's current
perspective, such a development would be unfavorable. For proponents of
regulatory competition, however, this development would be generally
positive. If advertising flows freely, the analysis of this article shows that
U.S. residents can reach foreign markets. Regulatory competition may be
achieved without a dramatic rewriting of securities laws. One need only
allow the free flow of information.
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APPENDIX A
Attached are printouts of two web sites where this author was able to
find information on unregistered initial public offerings ("IPOs"). The web
sites were found through a couple of searches on Google.com and
Yahoo!.com, and the exhibits were printed on April 16, 2002 and May 25,
2002, respectively. Exhibit 1 comes fromYahoo!'s United Kingdom website
and displays recent and forthcoming IPOs in the United Kingdom.2a
Exhibit 2 is from Credit Suisse First Boston's European web site and lists
information on recent European IPOs in which Credit Suisse First Boston
is involved.2 9
Exhibit 1 lists recent and eorthcoming IPOs in the United Kingdom.
The names of the companies are linked to pages that provide brief
information. Presumably, each national Yahoo! page has such a securities
page. 29
Exhibit 2 is from Credit Suisse First Boston's web site on European
IPOs. Before entering this site, there is a disclaimer stating that the web site
is not for citizens of the United States."' There were, however, no means
of determining whether or not the viewer was a resident of the United
States. The names of the issuers listed on this web site are linked to separate
pages containing brief descriptions of the issuers and of the securities.
The exhibits follow.
2W To get to an updated version of the exhibited page, go to www.yahoo.com, click on the link
at the bottom for the United Kingdom and Ireland. From there, click on Finance, then IPO Centre.
2W An updated version of the web site can be found by going to www.csfb.cotn/ipo/ and
following the link labeled "IPOs@CSFB Europe."
2 Unfortunately, each of the national Yahoo! pages are printed in the nation's native language,
and this author does not possess the linguistic proficiency necessary to investigate these other pages.
291 This author's experience is that the disclaimer appears only upon the first viewing ofthe web
page by a specific computer. Later visits from the same computer did not generate this disclaimer.
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EXHIBIT 1
I2Ma - M aol-
YAi5OOZFINANCEW Yahool - Help
IPO Centre Financia 'E, I IPO
Press Speculation I Flotation Announced I Prosoectus Issued I Offer Closed I Recent Floats I
Postponed
Company Trade Market Description
Name Begins on:
Investec is a diverse specialist banking company
29/07/2002 MAIN organised into 4 business units: investment banking,
treasury and specialised finance, private client
activities and asset management.
HLF was formed in 1999 from the merger of CE
HLF Group 16/07/2002 MAIN Heath and Lambert Fenchurch, in a deal that valued
the group at 200m pounds at the time.
Sky's strategy is to build a financial services group
Skypita 12/07/2002 AIM with operations in London and New York. It will
lydinga provide both share dealing and corporate finance
services for SMEs.
Thistle Mining is a mining finance company, whose
Thisle Mining 12/07/2002 AIM primary objective is to establish a substantial gold
mining group.
Burberry is an international luxury brand owned by
Burbera 12/07/2002 MAIN GUS, who intend to float off up to 25% of the
business.
C&C is Ireland's most broadly based drinks company
C&C GrouR 10/07/2002 MAIN and is also a leading player in the snack food
business and has significant international activities.
St Barbara St Barbara Mines is an Australian gold producer
Mines08/07/2002 AIM listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
MUIsi Music Copyright Solutions is a start-up music
.Coiw g N/A OFEX business, founded by three veterans of the business
Sthat have found a gap in the market.
D-etre is an investment company concentrating on
businesses which utilise the latest technology of the
Internet. Their investments propose to cover a wide
range of activities encompassing b2b and b2c.
FYixig N/A OFEX The 78-year-old locomotive plans to become a
Scotsman business, including a fairground and other related
products.
Cyworks pic was formed in January 2000 to be the
N/A AIM holding company of Medical Information 
Systems
Ltd (MIS) and PPF Publications Ltd (PPF), both
established publishing and data provision companies.
iN/A OFEX Applied Technology Monitoring makes web-enabled
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CHF 51.9 M No
EUR 3904 No
M
Deal Type
IPO
IPO
Deal Type
Block
Trade
TRL 30.000 Secondary
CHF 31 Secondary
EUR 14.25 Secondary
USD 98.25 Accelerated
U ookbud
EUR 35.75 Secondary
EUR 4.9 Secondary
EUR 2.8 IPO
CHF 255 Secondary
EUR 38.85 Secondary
165.75 Secondary
GOP 3.75 Secondary
Accelerated
GUP 1 Bookbultd
GUP 7.55 Secondary
CHF 470 AcceleratedOookbuiid
EUR 32 AcceleratedBookbuid
2002]
3-pr.2002
17-Mar-2002
13-Mar-2002
7.M-2002
21-Feb-2002
10-0ec-2001
6-Oec-2001
2.Dec-2001
28-NOv-2001
20-Nov-2001
15-Nov.2001
2-Nov-200i
17-Oct-2001
24-Jul-2001
20-Jun-2001
19-Jun-2001

